













Engaging the Community and its Partners

czbLLC October 2010

Open Letter to the Stakeholders of Greater Park Place

The revitalization of a neighborhood - a place - almost never is quite as much about the physical things as it is about the people. Physical things *do* matter. But the work of turning around distress, especially when the wider market is weak, hinges absolutely on changes made by people and by institutions in the way they think about a place and whether or not adaptation occurs.¹ For Greater Park Place to become a *community of choice*, the various stakeholders who have an interest in what kind of neighborhoods emerge are going to have to make no less than seven important changes.

- 1.A move <u>from</u> being "need-based" in how the community thinks about neighborhood distress to being "demand-based" (what must be done to compete for households with choices, so demand can exceed supply and values can stabilize and possibly rise) **The work is not about solving what's needed; it's about making the neighborhoods more appealing.**
- 2.A move <u>from</u> mis-identifying neighborhood some elements as "assets" because they're prized internally (when the reality is that the market may not view them as desirable) to being honest and objective about what is or isn't appealing. If the impact on the market of an "asset" is to push away healthy investors, it must be addressed. **The work is about communicating a high level of commitment to widely held community standards.**
- 3. A move <u>from</u> seeing outputs (the number of houses developed, for example) and activities (the number of meetings held) as the main metric to outcomes (demand is up) and impacts (the market is more economically diverse). **The work is about market stability.**
- 4. A move <u>from</u> a dispersal and diffusion of resources to a concentration of resources, thereby compelling all stakeholders to prioritize. **The work requires that very hard choices be made.**
- 5. A move <u>from</u> using resources to fix problems to the use of resources to build on strengths.

 The work is about tapping into existing optimism and growing it.
- 6. A move <u>from</u> an emphasis on the physical to a focus on the community and people who shape the physical environment through effort, risk, and financial resources in direct proportion to the extent to which it makes sense. **The work is about rewarding good neighbor practices and making it make sense to invest.**
- 7. A move <u>from</u> old pathways with questionable results to new ones shaped by residents taking positive actions on their own that appeal to the market. **The work is about doing things differently than has been the case.**

These are the adaptations we believe the Greater Park Place community must make. These are the adaptations necessary to arrive at the objective of revitalization. No less than the residents, relevant city agencies, nonprofit organizations, and Civic Leagues will need to make these shifts for there to be success.²

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How to Read and Use This Document

This document is written for the residents of the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place (Lamberts Point, Kensington, Park Place, and Villa Heights), and for their current as well as potential future partners. We use the term *Greater Park Place* simply to represent the four neighborhoods equally and to make for easier reading.

But it is also authored by residents for themselves and their future partners. Over the course of 2010 the foundation for what is in this report is quite atypical. In a conventional approach to a revitalization challenge, market conditions are evaluated and a strategy for turning things around is drafted based on data and professional experience.

In this effort, two critical distinctions deserve mention.

First is that property conditions (which reflect community standards) were evaluated by the residents of Greater Park Place. Moreover, not only were conditions collected and analyzed by residents, the criteria of determining what constitutes acceptable property standards to the community and what does not were determined by residents. This point cannot be overemphasized. Residents engaged in this project looked at their neighborhoods and they decided what was acceptable. What czb did was to "geocode" resident findings and "run the numbers" but residents provided the numbers and the reasoning. Furthermore, czb contributed a econometric structure to the community - explaining how property conditions reflect choices made by owners, and the consequences - but residents made the ultimate determination about what comprises a desired neighborhood and what is intolerable.

Second, on the heels of two large community-wide meetings and two dozen small meetings of preformed work groups, a core collection of a dozen especially involved leading citizens from Greater Park Place took ownership of the meaning of data they themselves collected, and began, without consultant support, to host and facilitate a number of small block level (and sometimes smaller house to house level) conversations in their neighborhoods. These conversations were informal. They were usually without notes. But they were structured in that they were organized efforts by residents to talk about what kind of a community they wanted to be a part of, what constituted acceptable standards of behavior, and what they were willing to do to strengthen their community and neighborhood.

These important parts of the engagement process formed the basis for what follows, summed up as the work ahead being about the community and its partners facing three truths:

- **1.Greater Park Place is in serious trouble.** There are too many owners not confident enough to invest in their properties and keep them competitively appealing to the market, and there are too many troublesome resident *norms* that undermine community standards.
- **2.Over time it can be revitalized and the market can become stable and healthy.** Despite the challenges, there are many families working very hard to set and maintain high standards, who are the backbone of a recovery.
- **3.** Almost the entirety of what now shapes the status quo need to be discontinued. From self-destructive owner and resident behaviors, to what at times have been ineffective *interventions* by the City of Norfolk and the Redevelopment Authority, the status quo will only change if those factors that have shaped it cease.³

We recommend these *truths* as we call them be thought of as part of the medicine the patient needs, mindful that it is medicine that may be hard to swallow. In the simplest terms, we have

a patient - Greater Park Place - that has gotten slowly but steadily sicker for the better part of the last 40 years. It is our opinion that this is the result of both the patient and those who've attempted to look after the patient not doing what was necessary and often times doing what was plainly not in the patient's best interests.

Akin to a person with emphysema who has continued to smoke, or someone with diabetes who has continued to overeat, Greater Park Place is a patient that, to become healthy, must stop a long list of self-destructive behaviors it has gotten too used to. Likewise, similar to a doctor who has repeatedly prescribed ineffective drugs and methods, Greater Park Place will not become healthy until a completely new approach is prescribed. The prospect for future health lies in *both the neighborhood and its partners changing course*. Residents need to show greater levels of house-proud residency and good neighborliness. Partners need to support neighborhood health by creatively deploying public safety and code compliance tools in ways that encourage resident confidence in the future and promote economic diversity.

This document is a tool to help the community and its partners come to terms with these truths. From the observations made by residents to the data gathered by consultants, the document is reference for the way things stand now. The principles discussed in the document might be thought of as *handrails*, a kind of support mechanism for everyone interested in the future health of Greater Park Place to lean against from time to time. When pursuing the aspiration to make Greater Park Place healthy, the principles contained in this document can help keep everyone focused on what to work on and aim for along the way. Most importantly, the document tells a story and the key part of the story is that this patient isn't getting better doing what residents and the City of Norfolk have gotten accustomed to doing, so things have to change if residents and the City want a different result.

We have organized this document in a very straight forward and accessible way. It is comprised of two related but distinct halves.

The first half is a set of observations and findings about the four neighborhoods that comprise Greater Park Place. These are observations made in part by consultants from czb, but largely, and importantly by residents who live in Greater Park Place. To stay with the medical analogy, this is like the diagnosis. Based on what the patient *presents* (symptoms), the first half of the report describes what is going on.

The second half is a set of recommendations for how to *move the market* towards a new and healthy future; how to reposition the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place to become more worthy of resident investment and more appealing in the Norfolk market. They are recommendations made by czb with a significant amount of input from a core group of leading residents from Greater Park Place who have given hundreds of hours of their valuable time to this and many other related efforts.

In our experience across the United States, in communities of all types, what we call "the work of revitalization" consists of two parts: the "what" and the "how". The "what" is *what is going on*, and *what has been happening*, and *what caused these problems*. The "how" is how do we go about changing course and how do we do what needs to be done?

This report - in being divided thematically into two sections (observations and recommendations) as we've described - corresponds with "what" and "how".

Part 1: Observations	Part 2: Recommendations
The "what"	The "how"

The reason for organizing this report this way is because, over the course of our team working in so many communities, we have found it very common (and natural) for a community in trouble living in a distressed neighborhood to resist making the changes it needs to make to become healthy. Just like a sick patient not easily giving up the bad habit of smoking or overeating, communities in distressed neighborhoods do not easily change their behaviors either. In our experience, it's less that residents don't want to, and more that it's hard.

We have also found it to be the case that resistance to change of the sort needed for revitalization comes not just from the community in trouble living in a distressed neighborhood, but from the city-at-large. Just like residents become accustomed to what's "normal" in their community, so too do other neighborhoods, city and civic institutions, municipal office and city agencies. Everyone together contributes to the status quo, and as suggested changes mean cherished ways of doing business must change, resistance is common. Our experience is that resistance comes in a variety of forms ranging from denial that it's that bad, to denial that "their" part in the story is the part that needs to be rewritten. Often resistance comes in the form of what we refer to as work avoidance. Put another way, resistance in the form of avoiding doing the things that need to get done, and this starts with embracing the status quo and one's contributing role in it.

In Norfolk, residents have to confront their culpability in making Greater Park Place unsafe and unsightly on too many blocks, and city agencies have to confront their complicity in enabling concentrations of poverty to persist in Greater Park Place.

Neither is likely to easily step forward and make such an admission, yet this is essential in our view. Until this is done, deploying the recommendations are not likely to work. So reading this report with special attention to what's going on and what's my role or my agency's role in it is crucial. Only then, after truly owning the status quo, is it prudent to dive into the strategy of how to reposition Greater Park Place.

Below is a schematic illustrating the thematic organization of this document.

Part 1

The "What"

Weak Market w Obscured Strengths Open Letter to Stakeholders

How to Read and Use This Document

Visioning and Engagement Process

The Challenge of Reaching Deep

The "Work" of Revitalization

Opportunity

Transformation Strategy Identifying Assets and Reinvesting in Them Beginning Rebuilding Healthy Market Conditions

Part 2

The "How"

Stabilization
Through
Geographic
Focus on
Recoverable
Areas
First

How We Recommend it Get Done Stabilization First

- > Resident Leadership Development
- > Partnership
- > Geographic Targeting
- > Sustained Intensity
- > Modification of Existing Tools

Tactics and Principles

What Should I be Doing to Reposition Greater Park Place?


What is My Role in the

Status Quo?

The Visioning and Engagement Process

This project was called a Visioning and Engagement Project (VEP) by the City of Norfolk. Its aim was that the community in the four Greater Park Place neighborhoods would come together over a course of roughly six to nine months during which time it would be engaged by a consultant team with expertise in neighborhood revitalization, and by one another. During the process, data would be collected about the neighborhoods and a strategy for revitalization would result alongside a community mobilized to begin the implementation of that strategy.

The process for engagement in Greater Park Place was built around a structure of four small "working groups", each comprised of volunteers from Greater Park Place who would work with consultants collecting and analyzing data, building a document that would articulate the community's cherished core values, collaborating on neighborhood beautification projects, and co-creating a revitalization strategy.



Volunteers were recruited by resident leaders using existing formal networks like the civic leagues plus those from informal relationships. Further, the work groups were comprised of residents whose participation followed additional outreach by members of an initial Steering Committee made up of residents from each of the four neighborhoods. Each working group was led by a member of the Steering Committee; the balance of working group membership derived from volunteers. Three of the four working groups were launched immediately at the project's all-community kickoff meeting in February, held in Park Place, at which 80 people attended.


The **Profile Working Group** was tasked with collecting field data in three areas. It was to interview landlords and come to understand the pressures rental property owners face in trying to manage a property profitably when the market will mainly support low rents. It was to interview businesses in Greater Park Place to understand the trade area and obtain qualitative information about customers. And it was to both conduct a residential structure conditions survey and establish a resident stakeholder criteria for determining (scoring) property conditions.

All together, the Profile Group - led by Lamberts Point residents Regina Turner and Thomas Harris, and supported by students from Hampton University - interviewed 20 landlords and 20 business owners, and took 1,000 digital photographic images of neighborhood conditions. The group established a four point scoring system to rate residential structures, with 1 being

equal to a great property in great condition, a 2 being a good property that needs a little care, a 3 being a decent property in decline needing quite a bit of work, and a 4 being a residential structure in a distressed condition. The Profile Group evaluated over 2,300 residential structures in an extraordinary effort of collaboration, but the establishment of equivalencies - creating a scoring criteria defined by resident stakeholders - is the real accomplishment.

The data was collected during the period March-May 2010 and the results were presented at the second all community VEP meeting, held in May in Lamberts Point. As both process and tool, the work of the Profile Group is of paramount value to the community in several respects. First, the data collected becomes a baseline. That means it can be collected repeatedly year after year at the most fine-grained scale needed - house by house - and progress or decline in Greater Park Place can be measured. Second, the data were collected by residents working together - at times with guidance from consultants and support fro students, but almost always without support when and where it mattered - and important bonds were formed. Third, the nature of the bonds that were formed were established along the incredibly important lines of what constitutes the community standard. As a critical piece of the work facing Greater Park Place is the establishment of marketable standards, step one is determining a baseline, and step two - not possible without step one - is establishing a line beneath which conditions are unacceptable. This was done by residents. Not by consultants. Not by students. Not by code enforcement statutes. But by residents who, in effect, started the crucial work of asserting some of their core values - including what constitutes an acceptable condition for a property - and, in the process, began to reclaim their neighborhood.

The work of the Profile Group is absolutely essential to understanding this project, this engagement process. A small handful of residents, many senior citizens, some with physical challenges, walked more than 160 blocks over an eight week period and with clipboards in hand, scored (evaluated) 2,300 residential structures one at a time, rating them from great to unacceptable. In the process they "said" - and are "saying" - some of our homes are acceptable to us, and some are not, and some are in between, and not just in vague terms, but with address-specific, geo-coded precision. Our team took this data, then coded and mapped it (see appendices), thereby creating easy to understand depictions of physical property conditions in Greater Park Place, and thereby establishing a picture of what the neighborhood is like now.



In growing community capacity, the extent of involvement in projects is important, but ultimately secondary to the degree of ownership in the results an effort produces. By investing so much time in evaluating their own community, the Profile Group took the most important step of all: coming to terms with the status quo. The scoring and resulting scores - however important a tool and metric it is - is still less valuable than the sense of accomplishment people have when they work together, endure a common challenge, exchange ideas, discuss issues, and form agreements, some lasting. Indeed the most enduring result of the Profile Group is not the scores, but the discussions that residents had amongst themselves about what constitutes a great property or a distressed property. These discussions, always informal, took place all through the Spring. Their relevance is grounded in the struggle of assigning a score - taking a stand that the whole group agrees with - about every one of more than 2,000 properties.

The Profile Group met weekly from late February through the end of May, and between meetings split up the 160 blocks comprising Greater Park Place. They compiled property conditions scores, photographic images of hundreds of properties (compiled on a CD-ROM for the City), and over the course of the work, came to really know the condition of their neighborhood, know one another, understand the relationship between property conditions and property values, and the own the status quo.

Following the February kickoff meeting, a second effort was launched. The **Values Working Group** began its work. This group - like the others comprised of members of the Steering

Committee and resident volunteers - focused their efforts on taking the temperature of the
community. Through photographic work, facilitated as well as informal discussions among
residents in homes, and on-line surveys, the Values Group workout throughout the late Spring
and early Summer to establish a baseline understanding of what the community holds dear.

Where the Profile Group was evaluating physical conditions and discussing amongst
themselves a criteria defining conditions, the Values Group was collecting and evaluating what
the community believes in, what it cherishes, what it values.

Just as the Profile Group was establishing a baseline for physical conditions and articulating those conditions as a reflection of owner intentions, the Values Group was considering the belief system of the community. It must be pointed out that there is a dual and seemingly contradictory component of this. Both groups were judging, making judgments, being subjective, being opinionated. Both groups were small self selected and self-motivated working groups of residents only partially representative of the whole population of Greater Park Place. The Profile Group was a dozen residents, half from Lamberts Point and half from Park Place and Kensington. Most were older. Nearly all were home owners. They were not a low income renter population. They were not landlords. Their views are not a statistically valid representative sampling of the Greater Park Place. In this respect the Profile Group was arguably saying something the whole community - in this case about property conditions and upkeep - might not agree with. On the other hand, the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place are disproportionately considered to be bad neighborhoods by the rest of the Norfolk market even though a small percentage of the thousands of properties and families are a problem. In effect, the Profile Group - though not 100 percent representative - was a group asserting itself and laying claim to important social and physical territory.4

This is exactly what occurred with the Values Group. Not fully representative of the population of Greater Park Place, it, too collected information (data) and assembled and organized it and began to try to make sense of it.

But though a constant stream of invitations to residents from all four neighborhoods - renter and owner alike was made, the composition of the Values Group was almost all property owners from Park Place. Though the neighborhoods were canvassed door to door by the Values Group to elicit additional participation and input on core values, the work mainly was led by a small group of owners and thus not widely representative of the whole of Greater Park Place. That noted, the work of the Values Group truly got under way in late May at the all community meeting in Lamberts Point, where input came from a more diverse sample of the four neighborhoods.

During that meeting, more than 100 residents participated in a deep dive exercise on community values, the central aim of which was for the community to decide the answers to two key values-based questions:

- 1. What's normal in Greater Park Place today, and
- 2. What would define our new normal

The responses were organized into a *from-to* template designed by the Values Group as shown below and presented in greater detail in the appendices.

	What's Normal Today?			Defining Our New Normal		
	What People See Today	The Message Being Sent	What People Believe	What People Will See	The Message We'll Send	What People Will Believe
Our Capacity						
Our Conditions						
Our Image						
The Market						

Eleven groups of 8-10 people from Greater Park Place worked as teams to fill in these templates, themselves collectively describing their community capacity, the physical condition of the neighborhoods, how they are perceived, and who the resulting market is.

By articulating the *normal* participants wanted to work towards, resident stakeholders began to clearly establish the kind of community they wanted to take responsibility for making. The meaningfulness of naming in small groups with great specificity what constitutes the status quo was all the stronger when the same participants engaged one another around the property conditions scored by the Profile Group. An accessible way to think about the work done by the community - even though by only a relatively small group of people divided across four working groups - is that some worked on defining "what's here now" (Profile Group), while others worked on defining "what we believe in" (Values Group), each feeding into the efforts of the Capacity Building Group, which was engaged in defining the community's commitment and ability to collaborate towards change.

From an uninformed perspective, the **Capacity Building Working Group** was focused on beautifying Greater Park Place. By this view, it was a group of residents whose purpose was to plant flowers and paint porches.

In direct, intentional, and stark contrast to beautification efforts by cities *for* residents, or by volunteers for residents where the primary aim is beautification and participation is incidental, and little to no lasting increase in community capacity results, this Visioning and Engagement Process took a180 degree different approach. In this effort, beautification was a component of the chief aim: using the planning and implementation of a beautification effort as an organizing tool.

While the Profile Group was collecting baseline data, and establishing the community's own benchmarks for standards of property stewardship, and the Values Group was working to articulate what the community believes in, the Capacity Building Group was weaving both those efforts into practice. The Capacity Building Group evaluated different sections of Greater Park Place, and talked about where beautification was needed. Because beautification was a useful compliment to the neighborhoods in literally hundreds of locations, the group had to work through where their efforts would be most productive. Through the generosity of the City of Norfolk, \$20,000 was made available for beautification purposes to the VEP. The Capacity Building Group had several tasks. First it had to figure out where in Greater Park Place beautification would be valuable. Second, with hundreds of potential locations, and limited dollars and volunteer time, the group had to prioritize. Third, the group had to not just prioritize, but do so in the emerging context of the work being done by the Profile and Values groups, which was slowly showing that some blocks in Greater Park Place might benefit more than others from improvements, and that some blocks might have residents who would take care of beautification installations to a greater degree than other blocks. Fourth, once having made site selections as a group, the Capacity Group had to marshall residents to both plan for an installation and then execute. It had an enormously difficult task: to evaluate the impact of beautification opportunities across four neighborhoods and make choices about where it made most sense to invest time and money, to develop a beautification plan as a group - what might get planted, trimmed, or painted where, to develop a stick to a budget, to prioritize and make hard choices, and to mobilize volunteers to get out on Saturday mornings and work through Norfolk heat and humidity.

Five projects were planned and installed using a portion of the \$20,000 from the City of Norfolk. Trees and shrubs were pruned. Houses painted. Garbage collected. Lawns mowed. In almost all cases, in less than six months, these improvements have withered, as the ongoing care of the improvements has fallen off. But the learnings and community-initiated "second stage" discussions that have resulted are the real prize.

In addition to the planning and installation of formal projects, members of the Capacity Group have installed smaller projects on their own, using their own resources. They have inventoried their own garages and basements for tools, and put in their own financial resources and have planted and painted on their own. While this was happening, the Values Group, which was tasked with holding facilitated discussions in their homes about neighborhood property and community standards of behavior, took it upon itself to hold similar conversations not in small groups but in very small one on one and two on one discussions. Values Group members held unplanned (by the VEP) barbecues and coffees. Not many - just a few dozen - but these conversations are noteworthy for two reasons. First they always yielded favorable results. Resident stakeholders talked about loud music and other sources of frustration - not amongst themselves but across lines, with people for example who don't like loud music inviting those who do over for a hamburger, talking through community standards, and working together. Second, these conversations helped establish constructive relationships that evolved over the summer, with members of the Values and Capacity Groups overlapping and beginning the process of building sustainable informal networks in the community not according to constructs like Roberts Rules of Order and Civic League formalities, but along the lines of shared interests in safety, aesthetics, and neighborliness.

The beautification of an empty lot or an elderly man's home is very important, signaling as it does to the wider market a sense of control in the neighborhood and the existence of standards. But the relationships that develop through the process of planning and beautifying, and the learnings that come with having to prioritize and work together to establish standards is what will outlast mulch and flowers installed this time and increase the chances that improvements get maintained over the long run.

In sum, great effort by small groups of people in Greater Park Place are yielding emergent capacity in the community. It is not a capacity that yet extends to low and very low-income renter households. It is not a capacity that yet extends to all four neighborhoods. Right now the capacity exists within a small group of two dozen home owners mainly in Park Place and in Lamberts Point. But it is a measurable, tangible, substantial capacity that did not exist six months ago and that will last. It is a capacity that is now connected to a resident stakeholder recognition - learned by experience not through theory taught in a class on obtained in a book - of the links tying together standards, property, property values, market strength, equity, and livability. And it is a capacity that if additionally nurtured will grow and eventually grow to include the more disenfranchised residents of Greater Park Place as this network strengths and trust and mutuality are seeded. This is just a beginning.





Which Neighbor Do You Want to Have?

Which Neighbor Signals What to the Wider Market?

What About the Condition Says What About Local Politics?

What Do These Conditions Mean for Property Values?

Final Report to City of Norfolk, VA

The Challenge of Reaching Deep into Greater Park Place

The work of community development can mean different things to different people, and be comprised of different activities in different neighborhoods. But the heart of the work consists of a community growing its capacity to adapt to ongoing challenges that neighborhoods face, and remain appealing to the market.

A community's "adaptive capacity" is its lifeblood. Its fuel. Its currency. When communities have a great deal of adaptive capacity, they are able to withstand market fluctuations, fight development threats when necessary, attract development and other favorable opportunities when present, and form constructive formal and informal partnerships with City Hall, the private sector, and other neighborhoods.

A significant result of strong adaptive capacity is market appeal, and this is best measured by the demand of the market to be in the neighborhood and can be expressed described by comparative housing values.

In the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, where a single-family detached home was worth \$156,344 on average in 2008, the same home in Norfolk outside of Greater Park Place was worth \$263,471, a \$102,127 difference, or 40 percent less. It means the market simply is not *willing* to pay in Greater Park Place what it is willing to pay elsewhere for the same house, with the same locational advantages.

Expressed another way, the conditions of the neighborhoods in Greater Park Place impose a discount on homes of about \$100,000. This discount has the benefit of increased affordability and is "worth" about \$600 a month in reduced home ownership costs; but it also have the negative effects of reduced investor appeal.

A second significant result of strong adaptive capacity is the composition of a neighborhood: who lives there. The higher the level of poverty, the lower a community's capacity to adapt to on-going challenges and render the neighborhood appealing to the market.

In the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, 30.6 percent of the households are below the poverty level, as compared to 19.4 percent of Norfolk; a 57.7 percent difference. Factoring in average family size, that means nearly one thousand families (968) in about a one square mile area are earning less than \$22,000 a year with a maximum capability of affording \$605 a month in rent obligations (median rent in Greater Park Place in 2008 was \$595).

When the maximum affordable rent for so many households is \$600 a month, the implications are substantial. A \$600 a month rent provides very little margin for an owner in 2010 to adequately manage and maintain property. The result is property tends to be poorly maintained. When repeated a thousand times in one square mile, the resulting neighborhood context suffers tremendously and this is what accounts for the market's propensity to *discount* Greater Park Place so significantly. Neighborhoods can absorb a handful of marginally maintained properties, whether owing to malfeasance, indifference, or something else. When such properties are the exception, the wider market will view such conditions as an aberration.

And a third significant result of strong adaptive capacity is the level of homeownership in a neighborhood. When one third of the families in a neighborhood are living below the poverty level, homeownership becomes less common except for the elderly in some cases. As owner occupancy levels decrease, absentee ownership increases, creating two results. One is less day-to-day on-site property oversight and stewardship. The other is higher levels of renter

tenancy, that is, families without a direct stake in the maintenance of their home manage property with less determination, and those with an eye towards stewardship are constrained by a combination of the owner's level of commitment to high standards, the property's cost schedule, and the renters typically limited financial means to contribute.

In the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, to go along with lower property values and higher rates of poverty than Norfolk, 68 percent of the households are renting, resulting in a dramatically low level of what may be characterized as deep and reliable stakeholdership based on shared interests.

These "outcomes" - low rates of owner occupancy, high levels of poverty, and low property values - all become entangled and self-fulfilling as they are manifest in reduced property stewardship and other actions that drive down neighborhood appeal.

However, what's not captured in these metrics is what are often two even more important - if more difficult to measure - characteristics: civic participation, and agency.

Sometimes quantified by membership in organizations or levels of voter registration, civic participation is the degree to which people are involved in the affairs of their community; the degree to which they as stakeholders contribute as individuals and groups to their own shared outcomes.

In its simplest form, agency is the capacity of a person or a group to impose their or its will on the world; in a complex neighborhood market it is the capacity to translate the imposition of its will into results that have positive outcomes for that neighborhood in keys areas like property values, poverty rates, and tenure.

Engaging the residents of Greater Park Place has meant running straight into a wall of high poverty levels, low property values, and and low home ownership rates held together by low levels of agency and by ineffective civic participation.

Reaching the community so that it would engage has meant - and will mean for some time - pushing as deep as possible in two key respects.

First, as is noted throughout this report, strong areas of Greater Park Place as measured by home values and home ownership and incomes have correlated with participation in this project. Leadership has repeatedly come from home owners, and from middle and professional income households who have expressed their stakeholder-held views of self-interest. Reaching this group will always be the key to making the most of scarce resources. From the very beginning of this project, high levels of active engagement have come from owners living in Greater Park Place.

The second group - low and very low income renters - were barely reached in this project, in spite of significant efforts. Despite a constant flow of invitations through open doors, this group did not choose to engage, and is thus not represented in this report in terms of self-defined vision. Phone calls were unanswered and messages unreturned. Emails were unanswered. Door to door canvassing produced little better in terms of response and engagement. Invitations to meetings made in person were typically greeted with friendly responses suggesting attendance, but promises of participation were largely unfulfilled.

Any vision contained in this report about the future of the Greater Park Place community or the physical neighborhoods has come almost entirely from owners and in almost all cases from owners living in Park Place and in Lamberts Point. Renters almost never responded to

invitations to participate. Citizens from Villa Heights almost never participated. Only a small handful of people from Kensington were engaged.

Going forward, it will be very important to invest resources to reach renters, especially low-income renters generally outside the economic mainstream. For any stabilization effort to become wider without making progress at the expense of low-income renters, such investments in outreach and additional engagement efforts aimed expressly at this population are crucial. In other words, genuine engagement of low-income renters in Greater Park Place is not necessary if the envisioned future lacks a place for them, a vision neither czb nor citizens we worked with endorse. But if the future does hold a place for renters - and we believe it should and does - continued efforts aimed at genuine engagement are necessary.

Considering what worked and did not in terms of engagement and outreach, our recommendation is that a resident of Greater Park Place be hired full time by the YMCA or a community development corporation, and that this person in part be charged with mobilizing the renter population to participate in establishing new norms for Greater Park Place - so that the new norms emerge not only from home owner stakeholder interests, but the whole of Greater Park Place.

The Work of Revitalization

This document is an evaluation of the market conditions of the four neighborhoods referred to as Greater Park Place. Those neighborhoods are Lamberts Point, Kensington, Park Place, and Villa Heights. It is also an evaluation of the community's capacity to manage conditions across these four neighborhoods, and a plan for revitalizing Greater Park Place into a *community of choice*. The document is divided into <u>four</u> sections across two parts ("what" and how"). First is an introduction, which provides a general and jargon-free overview of some of the challenges facing struggling neighborhoods like those comprising Greater Park Place.

Second is a discussion of strategy covering the recommended orientation needed to reposition Greater Park Place as a community of choice in Norfolk. Three important themes are introduced in this discussion: building on strengths, focusing resources, and addressing market conditions.

1. When attempting to revitalize a neighborhood, our judgment is always to start with *what works*. Building on strengths is more affordable than fixing problems. Doing so catches strong areas before they decline needlessly. Starting with strengths generates results faster. And focusing on strengths invariably means working where residents are already taking risks, being good neighbors, and demonstrating valuable and essential investment behaviors. The strengths approach also has the substantial value of seeing the glass as half-full, an essential ingredient in neighborhood transformation so long as realism and candor are likewise present. This approach - to build on strengths - is often counterintuitive. Most communities resist this approach, thinking either that fixing problems is a better way to go, or that investing in what's already working is somehow an unfair and inequitable use of scarce resources. Or they think both and wind up selecting areas that work emotionally or politically but which in our experience tend not to work.

Probably the most important message we can send to the City of Norfolk and to the residents of Greater Park Place - more than every other piece of analysis and idea we present here - is to resist the temptation to spend time and money either fixing things or working on the areas of greatest need. Neither will work in Greater Park Place. While trying to fix the blocks that are most broken, those that are only partly troubled will decline further. And by focusing on areas of greatest need - with what will inevitably be too few dollars - the opportunity costs for failing to catch stronger areas that were at risk will be very high.

Embracing the build-on-strengths approach also requires that the community come to grips with a daunting adaptive challenge. That is, a historic tendency to fail to build on strengths when trying to revitalize distressed communities - present in nearly every city in the United States - has led to tremendous displacement. We have found that communities have grown accustomed to discussing revitalization in the context of presumed consequential displacement of low income families, when the more pertinent statistically supported reality is that efforts that fail to build on strengths actually help push out the strongest families who grow weary of the status quo. When resident leaders who would otherwise anchor a recovery leave or emotionally withdraw, revitalization is doomed. Period.

2. The aim of a revitalization effort is to reposition a neighborhood as a place where the overwhelming majority of home owners there continually reinvest in their own homes. Reinvestment in this case can be financial, but more critical is effort. The most important thing to look for, and if missing, attempt to build, are blocks where the majority of homes send an unmistakable signal that the people who live in them care so deeply about their homes that maintenance and care are consistent high priorities. Absent signals that communicate exactly this, people who are otherwise unfamiliar with the neighborhood will

conclude that the neighborhood is troubled and too great a risk. They will avoid the neighborhood unless they see consistently tangible evidence that "this is a place people really care so much about they make it a priority". The key here is *consistency*. It's critical to build consistency. That is to build blocks where every home is a place that is cared for, so that the block *feels* predictable to the wider external market. Getting this done on blocks where this is already happening, as has been noted, is far more cost effective in terms of time and money than trying to accomplish it on more deteriorated blocks.

3. When a neighborhood is a place where the overwhelming majority of home owners are continually reinvesting, it has become a *community of choice*. People - owners or renters - are choosing to be there. They are not there because they lack affordable alternatives. They are not there because they have always been there. They are there because they choose to be there and choose to continually make it an even better place. This is a distinct *market orientation*, and fundamentally is based on the presumption that neighborhoods compete, and for them to do so successfully, resident care is the key to competitiveness. Neighborhoods have assets at their disposal to compete with: parks and houses and shops. The nicer assets, the more people from all over Norfolk want to be there. Most important of all, behind every nice park and home are families who care enough to manage property to a high standard, voluntarily, consistently, and energetically, to the maximum extent of their means.⁵

The third section explains *how we recommend it get done*. In this section, we present three important sequential, and overlapping phases of work.

In the first, we discuss the importance of **stabilizing the market in the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, and present recommendations on how to accomplish this.** This means building both a firm floor in market values (to the best extent possible in the current weak regional and national housing market climate), and an equally firm floor in community standards. Neither are present now, and both are essential.⁶ Residents and non-residents alike need to be able to know whether housing values are stable, so they can make an informed choice about how smart it is, or isn't to buy in Greater Park Place. Everyone needs to be able to know whether Greater Park Place is safe, so they can relax and do the things everyone wants to do without fear: let their children walk to school, walk their dog, forget to lock their car on occasion, and so on. Finally, everyone wants to enjoy life and that means being able to walk to the drug store, or bicycle to get an ice cream cone, or go on a date and all the while not have to see trash on lawns or listen to music that's uncomfortably loud.

In the second, we discuss the importance of **building resident capacity to manage the neighborhood and build confidence that the neighborhood is going in the right direction, and present recommendations on how to accomplish this**. This means working to bring the community together block by block to establish and raise community standards (or property care and public behavior) based on shared values.

In the third, we discuss the importance of preparing Greater Park Place for market activity and present recommendations on how to do this. This means getting the Greater Park Place community and the buildings and land in Greater Park Place ready for private sector generated investments and development that can inure to the long term health of the neighborhoods and the community.

Finally there is an appendix to this document consisting of qualitative and quantitative data, maps and tables and charts, a logic model for understanding investment flows, and a set of recommended metrics organized around the axiom: you get what you measure.

Opportunity

Residents of the four neighborhoods of Greater Park Place - Lamberts Point, Kensington, Park Place, and Villa Heights - have an exciting opportunity in front of them, an opportunity they share with the City of Norfolk.

The four neighborhoods can again become stable places to raise a family, meaning places that are safe and perceived to be safe, as well as places that are attractive to the real estate market.

Many neighborhoods in distress - such as those of Greater Park Place - lack sufficient assets to credibly contemplate a transformation of this sort. In such cases it is difficult to justify an investment in scarce resources aimed at a recovery because the challenge of turning things around is often too daunting and a genuine turnaround not likely.

But Greater Park Place is different. While facing substantial trouble, Greater Park Place has leveragable strengths that other similarly-distressed places facing comparable challenges lack. So while investing in other distressed places may be an ill-advised aspiration, Greater Park Place already has many of the elements needed for a bona fide turnaround.

It is ideally situated, and has a significant assets to build on. Greater Park Place is adjacent to the Zoological Gardens, and to Old Dominion University, and it is moments away from downtown Norfolk. The Zoo and adjoining Lafayette Park are potentially very powerful amenities. The students and academic atmosphere of Old Dominion University bring vitality and a diversity that has the potential to energize. A vibrant downtown and thriving commercial districts along 21st and on Colley Avenue give residents some of the City's best retail options less than half a mile from the Park Place Community Center.

Substantial turn of the century homes on spacious lots provide Greater Park Place with a distinct advantage in the competition for families who want traditional neighborhood living. Historically significant architecture lends tremendous aesthetic character to Greater Park Place, and numerous lots offer significant infill development opportunities that if creatively done, can both lead the market and preserve affordability.

Most of all though, the community is a source of profound strength and potential. Residents of Greater Park Place are poised to lead in the transformation of their neighborhoods. They have demonstrated significant staying power the past several years, diligently holding a transitional community together while doing everything necessary to start the planning process this report is a part of. They have worked hard through the Civic League structure to maintain close relations with the Police Department's Community Resource Officers. And in the past year have begun the especially grueling task of coming to terms with the complex reality that any real turnaround will ultimately hinge more on how committed the community is than on how much money the City can provide.⁷

In short, the significant physical assets combined with a truly committed core of resident leaders justify a range of public and private investments that in similarly distressed places in other cities we've worked in we could not recommend.

If the residents of Greater Park Place and the City of Norfolk commit to doing what is necessary to achieve stability, there is every reason to expect success.

The result would be mutually beneficial to current and new residents alike, but most especially to long term residents of Greater Park Place who have worked hard for years to strengthen their community. It would be embraced by adjoining neighborhoods like Highland Park and Colonial Place, whose quality of life would increase by having strong neighbors next door. And

it would benefit institutions like Old Dominion University and the YMCA of South Hampton Roads, both having a stake in the stability of Greater Park Place, and each with a tremendous capacity to favorably influence conditions for decades to come. Stability would significantly benefit the City of Norfolk in the form of increased property and sales tax revenue over time, and reduced demand for a range of costly city services.⁸

If the neighborhoods can be stabilized, Greater Park Place would be appealing again to many current homeowners who without improvements, are likely to want to try to sell their homes and move elsewhere. Stabilized, the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place would have renewed appeal to working Norfolk families who aspire to live in a traditional neighborhood setting. There are many families in Norfolk who will always look for good value and affordable entry into the market, and who prefer reduced commuting expense, but who are now choosing to live someplace else. Stabilized, the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place could see a resulting gain in overall home values generating home owner equity considerably more in new property taxes for the City.

Likewise, stability would result create and feed into still more economic diversity. That would increase the community's retail purchasing power, generating additional sales tax revenue and boost the chances of additional or improved commercial development nearby, if not in Greater Park Place itself.

Simply put, if the four neighborhoods of Greater Park Place were to become stable and, consequently, more appealing than they are now as a place to buy a home and raise a family, and more economically diverse as a result, the tremendous and now largely hidden potential of Greater Park Place would begin to materialize.

Of course becoming a stable market is no easy task. If it were, it would have been done a long time ago. Moving from where Greater Park Place is now - in distress - to stability, will require hard work over a sustained period of time. It will require substantial and patient investments and partnership across sectors.

Again, Greater Park Place is in distress, as shown by numerous indicators such as weak property values, low rates of home ownership, vacant lots, concentrated poverty, significant levels of deferred property maintenance, and crime. Yet the neighborhoods are entirely recoverable; given the presence of significant physical and community strengths, the community can adapt.

Recovery will not happen over night. But it can happen. It won't be easy. But it can happen. It will not come cheap, but recovery is less about money than a change in the way all of the interested parties work together going forward, and it can happen.

Transformation Strategy: Identify Assets and Reinvest in Them

The four neighborhoods of Park Place can be transformed.

To do so requires <u>first identifying assets of existing or potential value</u>, <u>and then leveraging them</u>. It does not mean deploying through scarce resources to try to fix weaker, more costly-to-recover areas of interest.

Leveraging an existing asset to an even more marketable condition always costs less in time and money than either creating an asset from scratch or trying to fix or undo problems. This is of critical importance to Greater Park Place because most of the state and federal dollars that the City of Norfolk might wish to use tend to be statutorily oriented around fixing problems rather than building on strengths. In addition, continual use of such program dollars, in our experience in other cities, tends to shape a city's internal culture about resource deployment. The default programmatic and cultural approach to neighborhood revitalization has historically been to start in the most distressed areas and to focus on fixing things. This is true nationally and may be the case in Norfolk. In our experience, it is a far wiser use of scarce resources to start on the areas with the greatest recovery potential and build on the strengths already there.

The two principal sets of selling points in Greater Park Place that must be built on are physical assets and community strengths. Each has an important role to play in neighborhood recovery.

The physical strong points are the combination of turn-of-the-century single family homes potentially desired by the market that are frequently on large lots with spacious side yards at traditional neighborhood densities, and six dozen vacant residential lots scattered throughout Greater Park Place. In both are important seeds of future stability and eventual growth.¹¹

But of greater importance is the fact that these physical elements become genuine assets only if they are leveraged beyond their current condition. In their current physical state and as presently owned and managed, even with their future potential, they don't strengthen the market, but destabilize it.

Too many residential properties suffer from deferred maintenance. It's frequently the case that otherwise admirable single family homes have been broken into student housing or low-standard apartments in some locations. Far too many homes are absentee owned, and not infrequently by prominent Norfolk citizens who operate them in substandard conditions. Properties are inconsistently maintained so even on blocks where really strong home owners are doing a great job of taking care of their property, it's not uncommon for the house next door to be in significant disrepair or the yards to be poorly kept, littered, or weedy.

Further, the architectural qualities of too many outstanding homes are obscured. The qualities of such attractive properties go unnoticed, depriving Greater Park Place of the economic diversity that would result from increased demand. The consequence of this kind of extensive disinvestment is an instability in the market; worse, it is a self-perpetuating instability.

Families that really are in the market for an affordable close-in neighborhood with a lot of character often will buy elsewhere in Norfolk, sensing that there's just not enough stability in Greater Park Place, in spite of all the many advantages of location and price. Disinvestment feeds on itself and soon the underlying asset becomes that much more costly and difficult to rescue.

Behind all physical conditions of course is the community itself: who lives there. One of the most important strengths to build on are the people who live there, the resident leaders who are holding the community together.

A point often overlooked in the work of community development - be it physical planning and design, transportation planning, or housing development - is that the amount of energy it takes for an average resident to make contributions to their community in a strong neighborhood is rather modest. In thriving neighborhoods the work is spread around, the conditions reflect years of consistent investment, and so any single resident who wants to make it better tends to have plenty of help and not so far to go.

By contrast, in struggling neighborhoods like Greater Park Place, fewer residents have the capacity to manage the neighborhood and so the burdens of working with the police or volunteering for the garden club fall disproportionately on a far smaller number of people. Plus years of disinvestment mean the work volume is so much greater.

For Greater Park Place - which is a full one square mile with more than 7,800 people, and is end to end more than two and a half miles long, these challenges become all the greater. Indeed, the fact that are such strong assets in leveragable shape speaks to the dedication and leadership within the Greater Park Place community. Each of the four neighborhoods has its share of vocal, talented, focused, dedicated, and knowledgeable residents who have held the community together through market fluctuations and, at times, ineffective public policies.

It's especially important not to focus on the number of homes in disrepair in Greater Park Place, though that is a tall order. Far more important is *seeing* the standard setting homes where residents - despite everything going on around them - are planting and watering geraniums, raking leaves, leaving their porch lights on, polishing their house numbers and mailboxes, and helping other neighbors. These are marketable strengths. These are leveragable assets, meaning these are signs the market looks for when it considers making an investment and these are assets that will take very little in the way of resources to enhance.

For Greater Park Place, the recovery strategy begins with the alignment of the various physical neighborhood qualities on one hand and the many community strengths on the other. Ensuring scarce resources are prioritized explicitly along these lines and with the strategic aim of growing these strengths is essential, and, of equal importance, protecting initial investments in the areas directly adjoining them

Given community development practices nationally, this may require a substantial shift in Norfolk when it comes to resource deployment. It may require re-thinking the lines along which dollars flow and to what purpose. Time (from residents, expert City staff, the Police Department, and NRHA), and dollars (from residents, the City, NRHA, and private foundations) are scarce resources. Their allocation must produce the best return. And the best return is an economically diverse market that is the effect as cause of neighborhood health. The fact is that there are too many blocks (160) spanning four substantial neighborhoods across too large an area comprised of too many structures for any gains to materialize if money and time are either spread too thinly, or sub-optimally deployed to the weakest (most expensive to recover) areas.

Having first identified the many physical and community strengths in Greater Park Place, and having made a shift towards concentrating resources, it is equally important that resources are deployed in a converging manner. That is, each of the resources that might be used to help stabilize Greater Park Place need not only be used in a geographically concentrated way, but all in the same place at the same time pointed in the same direction. In other words, it's

important to point resident leadership development efforts towards the blocks where there's already evidence of leadership, and on those blocks, protect investments with creative policing, curb and gutter, repairs, other infrastructure, home improvement loans, and enhanced code enforcement. When dollars for these activities go to less leveragable areas of distressed neighborhood, it is nearly impossible to turn things around and virtually certain those dollars will never trigger desired market change.

Transformation Strategy: Begin Rebuilding Healthy Market Conditions

Healthy neighborhoods are places where it makes sense for the overwhelming majority of home owners to continually reinvest in their own homes.

To transform Greater Park Place into a healthy place requires intentionality; that is it requires a commitment to rebuild the neighborhood and the community into a place managed by a group of residents holding shared values who are able to compete for more strong families in Norfolk with similar values. This means that Greater Park Place must be *repositioned* from a group of four neighborhoods that are second, third, fourth, and fifth on peoples' list of place where they want to move, to a *community of first choice*. And the place to start in Greater Park Place is on those blocks where there are already high levels of house proud ownership demonstrated by families that have been working hard.

In even the toughest neighborhoods in America - such as those found in Gary, Indiana or Camden, NJ - there's always a house proud standard setter who, against all odds, is out there sweeping her sidewalk, trimming her lawn, planting flowers, and making sure her curtains are straight and the porch light is on. All successful revitalization strategies begin with her; helping her do more. And in her case, reinvestment does not necessarily mean a new roof, so much as trimmed lawns and hedges, an uncluttered front porch, and signals that the person who lives there cares enough to invest the time, and sometimes dollars, needed to keep a place "house proud". Her high standards are what set the tone, and what convinces others to take similar investment risks.

At the same time, the problem of *where to start*, especially with extremely scarce resources, challenges this very notion, and requires more fine tuning.

In the case of Greater Park Place, the overall finding regarding property conditions and level of pride in the condition of one's home - which is the convergence of physical and community strengths - is twofold. On one hand no block anywhere in any of the four neighborhoods of Greater Park Place is so depleted of pride that there aren't one or two homes that are setting high standards. On the other, no block anywhere is without some properties that are in distress and the cause of still more distress if eventually untreated.

To rebuild a healthy market condition - where it makes sense for the overwhelming majority of home owners to continually reinvest in their own homes - the place to start work is on those blocks already closest to this condition. And while investments are being made on these blocks initially, there must be accompanying tandem efforts at the edges of those areas to protect those investments.

It happens that the blocks closest to recoverable health in distressed areas are those where at least half of the homes are well maintained and, on average, no more than one house per block has been abandoned. Outside of these guidelines, recovery costs - and importantly the time to recover - grows substantially.

What must occur on these select blocks? First, they need a full compliment of coordinated stabilization efforts. Second, stabilization efforts must be buffered by a surrounding protective perimeter to protect initial investments.

Targeted blocks should be considered the *seed blocks*, where investments are made in already promising residents to continue their standard-setting efforts. The aim here is to stabilize the market, and in Greater Park Place that means three connected aims on select blocks.

First, it is important to keep the market from sliding into free-fall. This is all the more imperative given the weak regional and national markets, tight credit, and excess inventory in Norfolk. The job is to build a firm floor in the value of housing in Greater Park Place by holding steady on key blocks that are leveragable and visible. This is done by upgrading homes, especially the exteriors, and thereafter product improvements like kitchens and baths, windows and doors, and energy efficient upgrades. It is also done by the continual investment in beautification efforts that are planned and led, and then executed by residents. And it is done by tying together all such investments in a coordinated, geographically focused manner.

Second, it is crucial to address slipping standards of property care. It's common to focus on blocks that are in a more deteriorated state, but on those blocks the majority of homes have been substantially degraded already and standards are often too low to feasibly *catch*. Another way of thinking about this is that if it's hard to sell a marginal home on a marginal street to good buyer, it is next to impossible to sell that same home on an even weaker block, and the resources needed to bring six homes up to standard on a weaker block are twice the expense of bringing up a dozen on a stronger one. Standards of property care have to be stabilized and with finite resources of time and money, its recommended that care be given to deploying scarce code enforcement resources first to the blocks most likely to be stabilized the quickest.

We encourage the community to do this by considering modifications to conventional code enforcement efforts. In practice, typical code enforcement is complaint- or vacancy-driven, and enforcement-oriented. In our experience, on the stronger blocks of distressed areas, as many as four in five properties with code violations can be addressed less expensively and less confrontationally by shifting to a compliance and reward mode. ¹² By shifting towards compliance-assistance, and reducing the time it takes to accomplish this, the result will be increased stability through predictably higher standards of care.

Further, we acknowledge that all the code compliance in the world will not alone either stabilize a distressed neighborhood nor even tackle all of the violations. Code enforcement of community standards is rarely if ever necessary in healthy neighborhoods for two reasons. It makes sense to maintain ones property in healthy neighborhoods because one can confidently presume there's a reward in the form of neighborhood stability and so compliance is consistent and high. Remember: compliance is voluntary and part of the fabric of the values a healthy community holds dear; enforcement alone isn't the cure in a distressed area.

For this reason, a stabilization strategy that depends on modified code enforcement should be understood by the community as 1) being temporary, 2) being part of what's needed, 3) being subordinate in importance to the work ultimately done by residents on their own independent of everything else, and 4) being consistent with existing norms on those already strong blocks.

Third, it is crucial to address the perception (and in some cases the reality) of crime and lack of safety. There is a well-documented correlation between neighborhood distress and instability and between instability and the presence of what is sometimes called *low level disturbance*. In layman's terms, this means when houses are in disrepair, yards are unkempt, people are yelling in the streets, and trash litters sidewalks, everyone (residents and non residents alike) perceives a place as having no firm standards they can depend on. There's little they can be confident about in terms of predicting their own safety, much less the safety of a financial investment in a home. They perceive that *anything goes* when there are no discernible standards consistent with their own.¹³

For Greater Park Place some blocks communicate to the wider Norfolk population a prevailing sense of disorder. This leads to falling demand to live there, and results in even more

instability. The way to address this disorder is similar to the strategies used to tackle property distress through modified code enforcement. In this case, modifications to community policing strategies deserve consideration.

Contemporary policing - even community policing as commonly practiced - has certain patterns. It reacts to crime even though it is described as a preventative tool. It aims to be close to the community but in some cases barriers between residents and officers persist. It is data driven. It responds to complaints.

For Greater Park Place we recommend modifications to the current approach to policing ¹⁴. Like code enforcement as one of several stabilization tools, we recommend that policing be seen as a stabilizing tool. Like code enforcement, which we recommend be focused in a prescribed geographic area likely to be turned around quickly once stabilized, targeted deployment of police resources in the same area is recommended.

As we will discuss in the next section (*Getting it Done*), stabilization is the first of three sequenced, and overlapping steps towards market recovery: stabilization, on-going capacity and confidence-building, and finally followed by market preparation. In all stages, we cannot more strongly encourage the City of Norfolk to incorporate important core principles into the work in Greater Park Place. We will elaborate on these subsequently in this document, but these are the actions and related principle highlights:

Principle	Action
Build on Strengths	Choose areas in the middle yet at risk; work there first and until fully stabilized.
Steward Scarce Resources	Prioritize and work in geographically targeted areas chosen for strengths.
Protect Investments	Deploy all tools intensively and in coordinated fashion
Build a Market	Phase out expectation of subsidies and encourage economic diversity
Be Outcome Oriented	Focus most efforts toward economic diversity, demand, and market value


How We Recommend It Get Done: Stabilization First

Overall, the four neighborhoods are in distress. Crime is high. Property is degraded. Disorder is common. At the beginning of this project, we pledged to give it straight to the community. So here it is: The four neighborhoods - overall but to varying degrees - are not stable, and are not going to get stable by a continuation of status quo norms of resident behaviors, a continuation of city police and code enforcement policies and practices, a continuation of the manner in which property has been developed and managed by NRHA, a continuation of needbased (we are needy) thinking on the part of the community, or a continued absence of a meaningful legal framework for addressing the manner in which rental property is owned and managed. Housing values, which are a very good barometer of the market's willingness to pay (for housing and for the the neighborhoods) are weak, uncompetitive as a result, and in many cases falling. Everyone is going to have to make changes - individuals and institutions alike, and in some cases the necessary changes - the required adaptations - must be considerable.

For this reason, we urge everyone with a stake in the future health of the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place to accept and embrace a crucial point: instability results from disorder, so we believe it is imperative that the community address this as a first priority, and realize it may only be accomplished by targeting.

Instability leads to reduced demand, pushing housing prices down and giving reason to families that can afford to move to make the decision to leave. This leads to reduced rates of home ownership, reduced owner occupancy, and decreased levels of investment in properties. Properties suffer increased wear and tear and over time it makes less and less sense for owners - well intended or not - to put dollars into their properties. In those parts of Park Place most acutely in transition - like sections of Lamberts Point and Kensington (and Highland Park) that are influenced by turnover, slum landlords, and ODU student rentals - this is easily visible and should be a warning signal for even more instability in the near future.¹⁶

The main point we wish to get across - to residents of Greater Park Place and to the City of Norfolk - is that disorder and instability are the flip side of concentrated poverty. It is almost never the case in America where both stability and concentrated poverty coexist, nevermind prosperity. This is why the <u>over-arching goal be to achieve economic diversity throughout</u> the four neighborhoods of Greater Park Place. In our view it is the only outcome that counts.



In our view, when the percentage of households in a neighborhood living at or below the poverty line exceeds 15 percent, stability becomes harder to achieve. We recommend that every effort be made to achieve an income distribution in Greater Park Place where no more than 15 percent of the households are living at or below the poverty level and about 75 percent of the households have annual incomes between 80-120 percent of the Area Median Income.¹⁷ No public entity can control the income distribution in a neighborhood, of course. But it can influence - positively or otherwise - settlement patterns through zoning and through deployment of subsidized housing dollars. It is our strong recommendation that the City of Norfolk evaluate the extent to which future housing development in Norfolk contributes to overall economic diversity in settlement. More specifically, we recommend that a city wide *fair share* policy be considered, or some other such instrument that may help ensure an equitable

distribution of market and below-market rate housing. When there isn't such a fair distribution, resulting cost-shifting (expense of negative externalities) arises in the form of expensive service delivery, multi-generational poverty, reduced tax base, increased crime, and decreased physical health.¹⁸

However, because the work of deconcentrating poverty can take decades, and because the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place do not have decades to wait, more immediate attention is urged in the specific form of <u>sustained</u>, <u>intense</u>, <u>targeted intervention aimed at stabilization</u>. Such a strategy has been effectively used in a number of arenas, from the approach taken in the current Harlem Children's Zone, to the redevelopment of the South Bronx during the Koch Administration, to the development of the Fruitvale in Oakland during the Brown Administration.¹⁹

In these and other instances, objective data (quantitative and qualitative) were used to establish a criteria for selecting a geography and for measuring change. In the chosen geography, a range of complimentary tools are being or were deployed. The tools being used were used intensively. And all efforts were aimed at clearly articulated outcomes that were measurable. There are many reasons for adopting such an approach for Greater Park Place. First, it is essential to build a firm floor in the market and in standards. Second, current levels of disorder and slipping standards beg for stabilization. Third, the Greater Park Place area is a full square mile, simply too large for intervention to be effective everywhere, raising the issue of where to focus. And finally, the conditions across Greater Park Place vary widely, so the same approach with the same level of resources will not work everywhere. For these reasons, stabilization efforts must adopt the same course of intensity, co-alignment, and concentration.

Resident Leadership

Intense Code Enforcement and Compliance

Intense Zero Tolerance and Community Policing

It is our view that these two efforts together will, over the long term, result in an eventually stronger market overall in Norfolk, and more quickly a stabilized Greater Park Place.

What would such a "sustained, intensive, targeted intervention" look like and how would it function?

The only way to retain existing and attract new working, moderate, and middle income families into Greater Park Place is to begin to address the sources of disorder that result from concentrated poverty. There are principally two: behavioral or what might be called personal actions in public space disorder, and property disorder.

As mentioned, both correlate highly with poverty rates. In short, where there is persistent and concentrated poverty, there will be persistent and problematic instances of degraded property (physical blight) and disorderly conditions tied to behavior or personal actions. In Norfolk, poverty is concentrated in a few parts of the city, and in exactly these areas there is resulting property and behavioral disorder and consequential market instability.

Throughout Greater Park Place both problems - property and behavioral disorder - must be addressed for stability to emerge, without which recovery is very unlikely.

To tackle the challenges of disorder, we recommend that there be two strategic stabilization efforts closely linked to one another. The first is <u>intense code enforcement and compliance</u>. The second is <u>intense zero tolerance and community policing</u>. Both must be tied intentionally and strategically to resident leadership.

The key tenets of the stabilization effort we wish to encourage in Greater Park Place are:

- Resident Leadership Development
- -Partnership
- Geographic Targeting
- -Sustained Intensity
- Modifications of Existing Tools

Resident Leadership, Partnership and Targeting

Stabilization is needed because disorder in a variety of forms has taken root in Greater Park Place. *Norms* such as blighted property and accumulated trash have become frequent enough to crowd out alternative norms like house proud ownership and stable or long-term occupancy and good yard maintenance. Other norms such as yelling, loitering, speeding, public drunkenness, and disorderly behavior have pushed down competing norms like good neighborliness and quiet respect.

Destabilizing physical and social conditions are hardly the dominant condition in Greater Park Place. On every block throughout the four neighborhoods there are numerous standard setting homes and proud residents who exercise leadership daily in their continual demonstrations of what it means to be a good neighbor. They help kids get to school, pick up trash, paint their homes, and participate in making Greater Park Place a strong community. But these house proud resident leaders are increasingly outnumbered and overshadowed, and have been for years; they cannot tackle such destabilizing influences as crime and disorder on their own; no one could. They cannot address the problem of slum landlord behavior by themselves; no one could.

Importantly, the residents of Greater Park Place are not helpless, nor do they need or seek a bail out. Far from it. Rather, the challenge of addressing disorder of the sort that has taken hold of so many blocks in Greater Park Place requires partnership, resources far beyond ordinary resident capacity, and specialized legal and other assistance.

Residents and the City of Norfolk - together - would benefit from seeing these challenges less as a problem to fix, than an opportunity to invest in what works to such a degree that what needs fixing soon gets crowded out. Furthermore, residents and the City of Norfolk - together - would likewise benefit from seeing these challenges less as problems the community needs to hand over to "code enforcement" or to "the redevelopment authority" or to "the police" than as opportunities for everyone to work together to <u>build a stable real estate market</u>. Much of the recent history of relations among residents and various public bodies in Norfolk is dominated by an either-or mindset: they do it or we do it. Working more <u>genuinely</u> together, by contrast - will have lasting benefits, not only as a result of tackling these challenges but with partnership as an end in itself.

It's therefore essential that all Greater Park Place stakeholders - residents, the civic leagues, the City of Norfolk, the Police Department, NRHA, ODU, the Y - come to see resident leadership not as an afterthought, but as integral to a stabilization effort, and begin to rethink what resident involvement in decision making looks like, how it functions, and what's its aims are

There are several absolutely crucial reasons this is all the more important.

First is the issue of unanimity. In short, there is some consensus in Greater Park Place on some things, but not on all. In our experience in inner city work, we frequently confront circumstances where a blighted neighborhood is all or nearly all African American or Hispanic or recent immigrants. Simultaneously we come across presumptions elsewhere in the city that the community must therefore be of the same mind. In Greater Park Place there is consensus that too few people maintain their homes, that the image projected is negative, and that a future *norm* should be that people care about their property and that standards are high. ²⁰ But exactly how to get to these future norms is a source of some agreement and some disagreement - as would be the case in any neighborhood - and so going forward in a sustainable way absolutely hinges on continued investments in mobilizing the community.

Second is that the community is - in our view - understandably divided about the issue of stabilization as a recommended element in a recovery strategy. In addition there are substantial divisions within the community on what constitutes disorder and who defines it, how to tackle disorder appropriately, the "rightness" of targeting resources, and where the targeted areas would be, if that course were chosen.

Many in the community believe that there is, in fact, significant disorder. They experience it first hand and have expressed in this planning process great personal frustration with issues like disorderly and nuisance behavior and with trash accumulation and absentee landlord problems. They want these issued addressed and have worked tirelessly trying their best to tackle such problems.

Others agree that there is, in fact, significant disorder, but draw the line on whether it's unacceptable or not, and also question the implied trade that dealing with disorders carries; this group sees the swapping of some current norms for new ones as part and parcel the swapping of some people for others. Apropos of this, others believe a version of *beauty is in the eye of the beholder* and their view is that concerns about such things as mowed yards and trimmed hedges and music kept low speak to standards and expectations held by outsiders, by which many really mean Whites, and some but importantly not all current residents, by which many really mean educated Blacks. ²¹

Additionally, some in the community have expressed concern that the mere mention of conflicting views of what's acceptable behavior is the leading edge of an inevitable and orchestrated effort to push out some current residents. Code words and phrases in use in the Greater Park Place community on this issue include "this is about pushing out the *bad people*," and "this is about making it a rich person's place again, and not for me." Fresh in many residents minds is the legacy of displacement from the effort to revitalize Ghent and West Ghent, which quite a few use as their sole reference to neighborhood improvement.²²

Invariably, trouble is going to arise in a stabilization effort that brings together the potentially toxic combination of police resources and Africans Americans with a memory for their historic (and sometimes recent) treatment by police departments. Further, when combined with American urban and especially southern history, standards that introduce issues betraying racial and class divisions, and anxieties internal to the African American community (Greater Park Place is 95% African American) about airing dirty laundry are bound to surface. Yet this is exactly what we are recommending because in our view it is exactly the right strategy to take to stabilize Greater Park Place, and will ultimately be healthy for Norfolk as a whole.

As we said at the beginning of this project, and continually throughout - orally, in public, in small groups, on-line, and elsewhere - the work of transforming Greater Park Place will not be possible without incurring some casualties.²³

Our view is that the community, though certainly uncomfortable and definitely not of unanimous opinion, has proven itself ready to take a leadership role in creating and then adapting to a new set of norms. This will require change of a most fundamental and personal sort, but we believe there is a core of resident leadership capacity that, with assistance, can modulate the distress triggered by overdue candor, and by this approach.²⁴

The two main tools that will be needed are intense code enforcement and compliance on one hand, and intense zero tolerance and community policing on the other.²⁵

But given the long and difficult history of settlement and urban renewal in Norfolk - and the recent and very alive memories of what was involved in the transformation of Ghent and West

Ghent, in addition to on-going frustrations many in Greater Park Place have both with policing and with what is *felt* to be the city's de facto position on slum landlords, the tools we recommend have to be managed in the context of a resident-led partnership of highly choreographed teamwork.

To be effective, intense code enforcement and compliance (ICEC) and intense zero tolerance and community policing (IZTCP) can't work independently from one another. We encourage the City of Norfolk to deploy these tools in a coordinated manner as part of a Greater Park Place team, led by residents whose voice in strategy decisions will be essential. Resident voice is crucial to begin chipping away at distrust between residents and the police, enabling police and code enforcement efforts to be more successful. And given resident disagreement over what constitutes "acceptable conduct" (for example, friendly good neighbor interactions, swept and tidy front porches, mowed and trimmed lawns), resident voice on code and other issues is important throughout.

Geographic Targeting, Sustained Intensity, and Modifications of Existing ToolsAcross Greater Park Place, there are important findings everyone should be aware of.

- New home construction between 1990 and present in Lamberts Point gives that neighborhood a distinct advantage. This advantage is, in turn, mitigated by the rapid turnover of ownership in the neighborhood and conversion of single-family homes to student housing
- Efforts by NRHA to redevelop on an infill basis particularly around Broadway and the Community Center in Park Place have *successfully stretched* the stability between 34th and 38th down to 30th, enlarging an important opportunity site. These gains, like those in Lamberts Point owing to new construction, are similarly mitigated by extensive disorder on 29th and Colonial

These assets and corresponding threats illustrate that investments can be imperiled without protective precautionary measures.

Because the distress in Greater Park Place is not just about old and worn buildings, but, importantly, about community standards and community capacities, real estate development alone is unlikely to trigger a recovery. Certainly in a weak economy, the opportunity for Greater Park Place to rebound on the back of a strategy based on absorbing and taking advantage of excess demand is not tenable.

Also, since every block in Greater Park Place has strengths and challenges, conventional approaches that tend to apply resources evenly (but thinly, and thus unsuccessfully) can seem on the surface to be suitable. In reality, a closer look at Greater Park Place shows that conditions vary quite widely, with the interior blocks of each neighborhood generally more distressed than those at the edges.

And because investments on one block are invariably influenced by what's going on nearby, it's important to design revitalization efforts with two related considerations in mind: 1) building on strength in a coordinated and concentrated way as previously discussed, and 2) protecting the fruits of those efforts.

A core ingredient of a successful revitalization effort is the manner in which resources are used. There are two elements to this: First is what they are used to accomplish, and the second is how they are used.

For Greater Park Place to recover, its essential to stabilize conditions and give the neighborhood some breathing space and an opportunity to start fresh with new marketable norms. New norms - differentiated from old norms - don't just appear, though. They materialize organically, in layers, over time through a combination of leadership and ordinary econometrics. The appearance and staying power of new norms though does hinge on the work of closing the door to old norms. This is the aim of stabilization: they put an end to current (old) norms that have proved self destructive. This creates room for new norms to grow and eventually redefine Greater Park Place. Therefore, resources need to be used in the early stages of developing healthy neighborhoods to create emerging stability.

This is best done by combining two proven deployment approaches with key revitalization principles:

Tactics

- 1. Overwhelming concentration of resources into a finite geography
- 2. Intense coordination of additional resources in that same geography

Principles

- 1. Build on strengths
- 2. Steward scarce resources
- 3. Protect investments
- 4. Build a market
- 5. Be outcome oriented

Nationally there are typical patterns for the investment of city resources in neighborhoods. For example, cities usually spread resources across too large an area, diluting impact potential. Cities also tend to fall short on coordination, for example planting trees on a block that is half a mile from a targeted revitalization area instead where the principal revitalization work is going on. Cities frequently invest considerable resources only to leave them exposed to unaddressed challenges a few blocks and sometimes just a house or two away. The common tendency across the country is also to rely almost exclusively on federal and state housing and community development dollars that are configured to respond more the needs of low-income families than to the market realities of low-income neighborhoods. And interventions, whether spearheaded by residents, cities, redevelopment agencies, or nonprofits, tend to focus on outputs and activities and programs rather than outcomes and impacts.

These tendencies may not be the case in Norfolk, but they illustrate the traps that surround attempts at revitalization and can serve to guide alternative and creative efforts in Greater Park Place.

For Greater Park Place, going forward with a genuine market-orientation will be important, and doing so in a scarce resource environment is a reality. The community in Greater Park Place is likely to be divided on targeting, on intensity, and on an outcome orientation, not to mention a market focus.

Examples of changes in orientation are as follows:

- Much of the community has grown accustomed to City and Redevelopment Authority (NRHA) interventions being focused on the needy, not on market conditions, so a shift there may be disturbing, requiring leadership from residents, the City, consultants, and others along the way.
- 2. Much of the Greater Park Place community has experienced targeting but that has historically meant that Greater Park Place has been a target, or within Greater Park Place the targets have been especially troubled blocks or needy families. A shift towards investing in existing strengths will likewise probably be disturbing for many. Leadership by trusted parties will be needed.
 - Such divisions should be seen not as a problem but an indication that genuine change is what's being debated, of concern, and on the horizon. It should be modulated so that adaptation in the community can occur, not avoided because of the discomfort it may cause.
- 3. To truly stabilize Greater Park Place, this large area must be reduced in size and the scope of ambition adjusted for the reality of limited resources. Locating strengths, building on them, and protecting initial investments is the best approach.
- 4. While there are strengths on every one of the 160 residential blocks in Greater Park Place, some blocks are stronger than others. And while there are challenges on every block, some are in greater distress than others. By focusing resources on those blocks where latent

stability exists and where the block has strong fundamentals like civic participation, house proud occupancy, and good neighbor interactions, investments in addressing existing physical distress are likely to be naturally sustained.²⁶

There are two parts of Greater Park Place where it makes most sense to create initial intensive revitalization target areas. One is in Lamberts Point and the others is in Park Place. Both contain important building blocks for genuine future stability. Both are at risk of decline, though for different reasons. Both are likely to flourish if intensive resident leadership development combined with intensive code compliance and community policing leads to true stability. And both are apt to grow in size and positively influence surrounding blocks provided new norms in those adjoining areas are encouraged.

To accomplish stability in these two areas, we recommend the following:

- 1. Each be designated by the City of Norfolk as a defined geography inside of which intensive code compliance community police resources will be directed for a sustained period.
 - a. In the targeted areas we recommend intensive code compliance (as opposed to using intensive code enforcement in "buffer zones" that surround targeted areas.) The shift will be to help residents take the last small steps towards compliance with focused, sustained technical and financial assistance.
 - i. It is absolutely critical that a <u>shift</u> take place as regards code enforcement. What is essential in Greater Park Place is not just more code enforcement officers. Though helpful, this is not what is being recommended. What is needed is for officers assigned to Greater Park Place to be focused more on helping residents comply with codes than with officiating violations. We found about 15 percent of the violations to be in homes occupied by the elderly who in our experience are not resisting compliance but need help. We found another 15 percent of the violations to be very minor in nature and not needing a citation, but rather a reminder and some help. We found about 25 percent to be more serious but in owner occupied situations so there was not the overt and frustrating an absentee owner challenge. All together more than half of the violations are, in our view, likely to move into compliance without citations, especially if done in partnership with resident leaders as we suggest. More code enforcement is needed, but it is the shift towards compliance assistance that is most necessary in the target zones. The City's creative use of such tools as a special services district are an excellent model for Greater Park Place.
 - b.In the target areas we recommend intensive community policing (as opposed to intensive zero tolerance policing in the "buffer zones".) The shift will:
 - i. Move cops out of cars and on foot and bicycles,
 - ii. Give community resource officers a two year assignment,
 - iii.Establish performance-based variable pay with bonuses for CROs assigned to Greater Park Place,
 - iv. Make the designation as a Greater Park Place CRO a choice assignment with higher pay and recognition than ordinary line officers, and
 - v. Introduce a range of alternative metrics for evaluating police success.²⁷
 - c. In the target areas we recommend intensively promoted and targeted home repair grants and loans with priority given to 1) exterior upgrades, 2) porch repairs, 3) energy efficient windows and doors consistent with existing pattern books, and 4) roof and gutter/downspouts
- 2. The initial boundaries of each are are recommended to be follows:
 - a. Lamberts Point boundaries: Between 41st and 42nd, and between 37th and 27th, and Bluestone and Parker
 - b.Park Place boundaries: Between 38th and 30th/29th and Omohundro and Debree

- 3. Each of the two areas receive intensive resident leadership development training and project resources
 - a. Training on Good Neighbor and other practices
 - b. Resources for residents to lead in beautification efforts
- 4. Investments in each are *protected* by establishing intensive zero tolerance policing and code enforcement practices in a surrounding "buffer zone" such as was done in Stockton, CA²⁸
 - a. Lamberts Point buffer boundaries: balance of Lamberts Point
 - b.Park Place buffer boundaries: Between the target area edges and Colonial, Granby, and 28th.
- 5. Each of the "buffer zones" receive coordinated policing and code enforcement with special emphasis
 - a. Zero Tolerance Policing
 - i. Dragnets for speeding, driver's license checks, insurance checks
 - ii. Zero tolerance on drunk and disorderly, loitering, littering, loud public behavior, loud music, verbal harassment, auto licensing
 - b.Zero tolerance code enforcement
 - i. Zero tolerance on property code violations; focus on licensing and permitting
 - ii. Zero tolerance on yard maintenance infractions

To Norfolk's considerable credit, some of both of these thrusts are in use already, should be encouraged, and expanded.

- ✓ Creative code enforcement under the direction of the Department of Planning has been in use for some time, with dramatically positive results in certain areas.
- ✓ The use of Community Resource Officers by the Norfolk Police Department has had measurable success in the past in Greater Park Place.

Understandably, resources are thin for such stabilization tools. But three particular tactics will prove invaluable in revitalizing Greater Park Place. The first is focused intentional partnership with residents leaders during the administration of targeted policing and code compliance efforts. The second is the intentionality of focusing efforts not just in *any* targeted area, but in areas where there is already considerable strength. The third is the protection of initial investments.

Accomplishing this will require a formal organization of efforts and may require a nonprofit or other similar entity to help coordinate, such as the Old Dominion UNiversity CDC. We would encourage the creation of multi-disciplinary teams at the ground level of residents, CROs, and code enforcement officers, and a similar partnership overseeing overall coordination, target area refinement and expansion, and annual strategy adjustment as needed.²⁹

Capacity Building Preparing the Market	Targeted S	tabilization		
Preparing the Market		Capacity Building		
			Preparing	the Market

How We Recommend it Get Done: Building Resident Capacity and Confidence

Stabilizing the two target areas will probably take no less than three years, so efforts must be sustained for that long. This will give the market time to adjust to new signals that convey new norms and to determine whether these are genuine and lasting or whether they are fleeting like so many trees planted that never get watered.

During this period, it is critical that the "buffer zone" maintain its zero tolerance posture, essentially locking down the perimeter. But it is also essential that the *other 130 blocks* across the rest of Greater Park Place not be forgotten. Focusing concentrated resources in targeted areas is not tantamount to giving those areas all the attention. Indeed there is no better way to sink the effort in target areas than to do *everything in some areas and nothing elsewhere*.

This is one reason why investments in community capacity must occur throughout Greater Park Place.. The main difference between the conditions in the target areas and everywhere else is not physical, though there are physical differences. It's community capacity. As noted, behind every flower bed is a gardener. Inside every scraped and painted house is a house proud resident. On the other side of every trimmed hedge is a good neighbor. Physical assets in the target area are important because inside of them are strong community assets - resident leaders making essential investments every day in their homes and on their blocks.

Getting the rest of Greater Park Place into this same shape will not come about by focusing on physical distress. Instead it will eventually emerge in direct proportion to the investments made in developing community capacity to become good stewards of homes and blocks and good neighbors.


To accomplish this we recommend that the City of Norfolk, in partnership with NRHA establish a city wide competition for beautification resources, and pilot the effort for three years in Greater Park Place. Four times a year funds would be available on a competitive basis to groups of residents (not in the target area, where resources are already available) wishing to work together to beautify their blocks. Assistance and coordination could be made available by various City agencies.

Small incremental awards from \$500 - \$1,500 would be available for plants and shrubs, paint, window treatments, doors, signage, flags, and other elements. A reduced number of larger, more substantial awards in the 3,000-\$5,000 range would be available for more adventurous proposals. Neighbors would receive organizing assistance for planning and implementation, putting together an application, managing funds, and installation and maintenance. In advance of this a capacity building team for Greater Park Place - consisting of police officers, residents, volunteers, and City and NRHA staff - would design award applications and criteria and establish resident juries.

In a conventional effort, the goal would be for the City or NRHA to install beautifying elements across Greater Park Place. This is not the goal recommended here. The beautifying elements are as incidental as they are valuable visual enhancements. The real aim is to mobilize the community of Greater Park to achieve more the important objectives of working together, planning, follow-through, the establishment of standards of property care, and the implications for on-going maintenance of new installations. This is a learned skill present in healthy neighborhoods.

Given the magnitude of community building needed across Greater Park Place for new norms to take hold and supplant self destructive behaviors that have rooted, we believe no less than 12 small and three large projects would be needed each year for five years. If initiated in 2011, 60 small efforts and 15 more substantial projects could be installed, each depending on

resident cooperation and partnership, on-going and crucial community-building dialogue, and the overall re-establishment of standards.



As projects take shape - in their aim, planning, execution, and post installation management - it will become clear which parts of Greater Park Place are next in line for intense stabilization efforts. For example, it is very likely that within two years of intensive work in the Virginia Place target area, blocks west of DeBree will be sufficiently stable to enlarge the target zone, if not shift it entirely. By this time those blocks will conceivably have nurtured half a dozen small and one or two more substantial beautification efforts. If not, it might make more sense to shift the target area not west but south where, by contrast, unexpected resident leadership may have emerged more quickly and robustly than anyone thought possible.

The underlying thrust is to invest in community capacity by encouraging residents to practice being a community based on the creation and maintenance of new self-defined standard-setting norms, and to provide this encouragement consistently and collaboratively. Yes, Greater Park Place is comprised of four physical neighborhoods. And yes, it is a community, and also there are many communities within Greater Park Place, some thriving. But mainly the community-at-large in Greater Park Place is a struggling group of residents without a history of working together successfully with sufficient frequency to be able to assert itself and its standards in a way that positions Greater Park Place to compete for strong Norfolk families. With partnership it can be.


The aim of capacity building will be to create a series of linked small victories, each offering opportunities for residents to learn about one another and work together to make the neighborhoods healthy. This will have the valuable lasting benefit of residents learning to look inward first for solutions, to be self reliant as a community, to experience first hand the work of on-the-ground prioritization owing to limited time and dollars, and, over time, to see economic diversity as a strength, not merely an indication of loss so often present as a worry in low-income and especially African American communities.



Recommend It Get Done: Preparing Greater Park Place for Market Activity

The tendency in many cities is to attack blight by redeveloping real estate. There is an understandable logic to this approach. Building appearances show wear and tear and disinvestment. Replace the old buildings with new ones. To the extent that old is less desirable than new - which is frequently the case - old structures fetch lower rents and sales prices and generate lower rates of return for investors.

But when there is sustained decline - as is the case with Greater Park Place, which has suffered 40 years of flat or falling relative value and as long a period of sustained concentrated poverty - far more than physical distress takes hold. And far more (and less) than real estate development is appropriate.



The community becomes less cohesive and there is little continuity of standards that appeal to the wider market. Values drop as prices fall which react to sagging demand, and eventually real estate value and equity get lost due a distressed community's self-destructive norms and inability to break bad habits.

In these cases, real estate activity - when there is any - falls into two categories. The first is private sector development in the form of absentee rental property ownership that eventually gives way to slum property management practices and, if the economy is otherwise strong, flipping. The second is below-market rate development by the public sector utilizing subsidy. Neither though contribute to revitalization. The former is an extraction approach to real estate that bleeds structures down to a value-less core and incubates a wide range of social problems. The latter is an effective ceiling on market-based, risk-oriented activity that can only result in lowering values or requiring on-going subsidy. In neither case is real estate ever really brought back to stable market conditions³⁰.

To bring Greater Park Place back to market conditions, it will need to first be stabilized, as discussed, and we estimate this will take several years. During this time, outside of targeted stabilization areas in Greater Park Place, sustained community building will be necessary. Only after the market has shown consistent signs of being stabilized should normal real estate activity be considered.

When the target areas are stabilized, and when a sustained zero tolerance approach to codes and crime has been achieved in the buffer zones, the market will again appeal to buyers from outside Greater Park Place. They will be attracted to the same things that have always made Greater Park Place appealing: location, character, historic homes, and adjoining amenities. But once stabilized, these considerable assets will no longer be obscured by street level social disorder or by physical deterioration. For years to come there will be residual disorder and it may take decades to suss out all of the physical deterioration. But once stabilized, lingering challenges will increasingly be tackled not by government and programs but by residents and market forces.

The third of the phases of work - preparing Greater Park Place for market activity - is really a temporary phase. It's the transition phase that functions as a handoff from stabilization and capacity building work requiring intense public-private partnership and considerable public investment, to mainly private market choices and consequences. For many low-income communities this potentiality - however far off in the distance - is fearsome, for the raw edges of the market most of the time put quality housing and good neighborhoods out of the reach of working families. But this is precisely what has to happen in Greater Park Place. The market needs to be permitted to function and low-income families with little to no previous history of successfully participating in the market should be given a chance to obtain some of the upsides of increased value.

To help steer the market towards healthy and equitable outcomes, it will be crucial that the City of Norfolk begin to assess the extent to which fair share concepts (equitable distribution of affordable housing, through, for instance, inclusionary zoning) are workable. It will also be essential the the City and NRHA commit to ending the deployment of any dollars for new housing in Greater Place not explicitly aimed at households with incomes at or above 100% AMI until such time as poverty rates are consistently below 15 percent overall for Greater Park Place and individually in each of the four neighborhoods. Additionally, vacant lot development should be aimed at residential infill that is always contributing to economic diversity. And when NRHA has acquisition and rehabilitation opportunities - whether for single or multifamily housing development - at no time should development fail to be income-mixed.³¹

For the most part, acquisition and rehabilitation will be the bread and butter of the slow transformation of the markets in Greater Park Place. Infill will, and should occur. But absent a white hot market that could finance demolition, 90 percent of the structures for the foreseeable future will be single family homes and duplexes built before WWII. These structures represent outstanding development opportunities.

The private sector will be slow to return to Greater Park Place given the current economic picture, the cost of dealing with deferred maintenance on older homes, and the relatively excellent values that can be obtained in a dozen neighborhoods in Norfolk with equal or better amenities. Stimulating a return by the private sector will be necessary and will fall to the NRHA, or to one or more alternative development entities such as the Old Dominion University CDC or one not yet created but which has a mission to develop with resident equity and community ownership top priorities.

If NRHA, the City, or another entity considers stepping into the void, all efforts should be aimed not at creating products that require continual streams of unsustainable subsidy, but, rather, those that appeal to the wider market, contribute to furthering demand, and begin to set ever higher expectations of a good return. To do this, priority should be given to:

- Supporting owner-occupants' aspirations for new roofs, gutters, downspouts, exterior siding, energy efficiency upgrades, and front porches
- -Supporting rental property owners who wish to upgrade rental units
- -Supporting upgrades of kitchens and additions of second baths
- -Supporting significant landscaping on private property
- Supporting conversions of duplexes back to single-family detached homes
- Encouraging at and above-market infill
- Encouraging and supporting energy efficiency

Of course the same timeless principles apply, chief among them: working in concentrated fashion to generate the maximum impact. This means, for example, the dozens of vacant parcels now under control of NRHA need to be seen in clustered fashion and developed in

relation to other on-going considerations, namely: where are the greatest strengths that can be built on, where is the most momentum now that can be built on, and where is the greatest convergence of resources?

Appendices

- A Findings (Data Encyclopedia)
- B Housing Market Analysis
- C Metrics and Logic Model
- D Themes for the Residents of Greater Park Place to Consider
- E Core Values and a Migration to a New Self-Defined, Competitive Normal
- F Implementation Structure
- G Consultant Comment
- H Notes on Participation

Appendices

A - Findings (Data Encyclopedia) (Tables and Raw Data Available on CD-ROM)


			Lots	Single	Family	Mult	ifamily	Comn	nercial	Indu	ıstrial	Pu	blic	Single Fam	ily Averages	Field S	cores	SF Sale	es .
Submarket	Properties	Total	Pct	Total	Pct	Total	Pct	Total	Pct	Total	Pct	Total	Pct	Year Built	Assessed Values	Avg	#	Avg	#
Kensington Central/ Park Place Community Center	543	143	0	241	0	137	0	14	0	0	0	8	0	1936	140,322	2.40	354	88.820	113
Kensington West/Park Place South	935	276	0	373		202	0		0	22	0		0	1932	126,494	2.75	531	90,886	
LP Central	47	2	0	29		16		0	0	0	0		0	1957	150,917	2.36	30	107,786	
LP East	217	60	0	127	1	24	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	1948	147,149	2.34	150	118,819	50
LP North	231	43	0	122	1	58	0	6	0	0	0	2	0	1940	126,631	3.28	156	123,898	4
LP South	11	2	0	8	1	0	0	- 1	0	0	0	0	0	2003	220,025	1.14	7	176,880	
LP West	270	80	0	122	0	63	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	1955	139,793	2.72	175	127,900	6
Park Place Central	332	56	0	170	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1952	182,372	1.79	238	142,709	8
Park Place Community Center North	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
Park Place North	324	54	0	180	1	60	0	23	0	0	0	7	0	1928	158,279	1.86	214	106,721	8
Park Place NE	39	2	0	16	0	16	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	1936	220,744	2.35	31	187,279	
Park Place South + Villa Heights West	217	83	0	29	0	21	0	61	0	21	0	2	0	1945	164,238	2.74	42	147,329	1-
Villa Heights Central	101	38	0	35	0	26	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1938	128,460	2.54	59	94,858	1
Villa Heights East	46	24	1	11	0	9	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1937	116,473	2.67	18	70,000	
Totals/Avgs	3,314	864	26.07%	1,463	44.15%	732	22.09%	164	4.95%	43	1.30%	48	1.45%	1947	155,531	2.38	2,005	121,837	64

		Bound	laries	Boundaries								
	N	S	E	W								
Kensington Central/ Park Place Community Center	35-38th-35t h	S Point-27 th-38th- Lambert' s Point	Colley- Gosnold- Colley	Killiam -35th/ Lambe rt's Point								
Kensington West/Park Place South	38th- Lamberts Point-27th- 28th- Lambert's Point-28th- 30th-33rd	23-25-28 th	Church St	Hampt on								
LP Central	39th	38th	Bluestone	Parker								
LP East	43rd	25th	Hampton	Parker - Bluest one- Elkhor n								
LP North	43rd	25th	Hampton	Parker								
LP South	25th	24th	Bluestone	Elkhor								
LP West	43rd	25th	Parker- Bluestone- Elkhorn	Powha tan								
Park Place Central	38th	30th	omohundro	DeBre e								
Park Place Community Center North	Lambert's Point	31st	Newport	Gosno Id								
Park Place North	38th	35-34-35 th	DeBree	Colley								
Park Place NE	38th	33rd	Granby	Omoh undro								
Park Place South + Villa Heights West	25th-28th-2 9th-28th-29 th	23rd-26t h-27th	Waverly Way	Colley Ave								
Villa Heights Central	30th	28th- Waverly Way	Druid Circle	Fawn Street								
Villa Heights East	Druid Circle-Villa Circle	Villa Circle	Villa Circle	Gazel Street- Druid Circle- Ruffin Way								
Totals/Avgs												

_	44.15% /32 22.09%	101 1.5570	43 1.30%	48 1.45%		947	155,551	2.38 2	,005	121,03	/ 040
1				Unit	is				Der	nograp	nics
		Total	Vacant	Abandoned	Occup ied	Owner - Occupi ed	% Aband oned	% Owner- Occupie d	Popul ation	% Black	% Non- Hisp anic Whit e
	Kensington Central/ Park Place Community Center	630	123	59	507	181	0	0	1,511	1	0
	Kensington West/Park Place South	1,053	165	63	888	275	0	0	2,371	1	0
ı	LP Central	63	12	8	51	17	0	0	169	1	0
1	LP East	165	16	8	149	71	0	0	397	1	0
l	LP North	310	59	20	251	60	0	0	832	1	0
ı	LP South	0	0	0	0	0			0		
ı	LP West	265	49	22	216	61	0	0	635	1	0
ı	Park Place Central	422	87	19	335	105	0	0	935	1	0
ı	Park Place Community Center North	0	0	0	0	0			0		
ı	Park Place North	366	60	17	306	133	0	0	881	1	0
1	Park Place NE	72	11	1	61	26	0	0	149	1	0
	Park Place South + Villa Heights West	149	38	10	111	13	0	0	356	1	0
ı	Villa Heights Central	214	39	9	175	34	0	0	459	- 1	0
1	Villa Heights East	77	14	5	63	10	0	0	169	1	0
ı	Totals/Avgs	3,786	673	241	3,113	986			8,864		




Analysis of Field Survey Scores



Sources: 2009 Landbook, City of Norfolk, czbLLC.

Results for Villa Heights are not significant – there were fewer than 20 properties with both sale and field survey data per category.


^{*}Averages are calculated using the most recent sale, as reported in the 2009 Landbook, for single-family homes, where the most recent sale occurred after December 31, 2004.




Sources: City of Norfolk, czbLLC.

Field Survey Scores and Year Built








Sources: 2009 Landbook, City of Norfolk, czbLLC.



















Sale Price Trends of Single-family Homes in Norfolk by Census Tract, 2005-2009


According to data from the 2009 Landbook (provided by the City of Norfolk), the average sale price of single-family homes (parcels with a property class of 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, or 519) climbed citywide from 2005 to 2007 and fell (to below its 2005 figure) from 2007 to 2009. At the Census Tract level, Lambert's Point (Tract 25) and Park Place East (Tract 29) appeared to recover between 2008 and 2009; this was not the case in Park Place West (Tract 27).


Geography		Average Sale Price of Single-family Homes									
Geography	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All Years					
Census Tract 25 (Lambert's Point)	\$144,600	\$170,748	\$172,050	\$148,029	\$162,028	\$157,309					
Census Tract 27 (Park Place West)	\$105,559	\$141,647	\$149,927	\$129,631	\$107,328	\$126,273					
Census Tract 29 (Park Place East)	\$114,087	\$132,628	\$159,695	\$132,546	\$145,975	\$135,426					
Citywide	\$194,995	\$212,428	\$220,399	\$201,980	\$189,926	\$205,241					



The average sale prices in target area Census Tracts were among the lowest in 2005. This continued to be true of Park Place West (Tract 27) in 2009.







Appendices

B - Housing Market Analysis

Three major uncertainties cloud any discussion of future trends in housing demand in Norfolk and the Park Place neighborhood:

- 1. Uncertainty about future population and economic trends in the Virginia Beach MSA—the macro market that shapes housing demand
- 2. Uncertainty about recent population trends for Norfolk—one estimation series indicates contraction while another indicates growth
- 3. Uncertainty about the impact of the Great Recession, the timing of housing market recovery and fundamental shifts in housing finance

Uncertainty about Virginia Beach MSA Trends

Since 2000, there have been two separate series of population estimates for Virginia counties and cities using two different models. Prior to 2000 the same model had been used by the US Census Bureau and the University of Virginia's Weldon Cooper Center. After 2000, the Census Bureau decided to use one model throughout the nation, whereas the Weldon Cooper Center's demographers decided that the model previously used for Virginia provided better accuracy for localities within the Commonwealth.

The different models produce significantly different annual results, particularly for the Tidewater area, as can be seen in the following figure, although they converge by 2009.

The Census Bureau estimates that the population of the Virginia Beach MSA peaked in 2006 and declined slightly since. A recent report by the Brookings Institution reflects the Census Bureau's estimates in classifying the Virginia Beach MSA as one of ten declining or slowest growing MSAs in the nation between 2006 and 2009. The Weldon Cooper model indicates slower growth at the beginning of the decade, but markedly higher growth after 2006.

The difference in these estimates is not just a concern of demographic modelers, but is a cause of considerable hand-wringing and uncertainty about future growth trends for the region. These trends help shape local population dynamics and could have a direct impact on future housing demand in Norfolk—if the future is one of stagnant or declining regional growth, Norfolk will have to increase its market share and competitiveness to remain stable. However, if the region is growing, Norfolk can grow if it holds on to its current market share, or stay stable even with a declining market share. Given the impact of military personnel on the region's population, the mid-decade 'surge' detected in the Census Bureau's estimates could be a temporary anomaly without long-term significance, and if Federal support for Norfolk military operations wanes, the implications are substantial.

Net-migration is at root of the difference between these two estimates of recent population trends.

According to the Census Bureau, net migration for the Virginia Beach MSA has recently turned negative, with more people moving out of the area than moving in. Although net international migration and natural increase (births exceeding deaths) help offset this shift in net domestic migration, the shift in annual net domestic migration since 2002-03 to 2007-08 represents a loss of over 25,000 people annually. The Census Bureau estimates net domestic migration from the year-to-year mobility of tax filers, Medicare enrollees, and military movement. The Weldon Cooper model does not estimate net migration directly but from shares of public school populations, licensed drivers, and Virginia tax filers. To the extent that the Census Bureau's estimates reflect a shift in the long-term trend in net migration for Virginia Beach and Norfolk, the 2006 to 2009 trend would suggest weaker demand for housing. However, if the mid-decade surge estimated by the Census Bureau reflects a temporary military surge, the Weldon Cooper estimates should be a more reliable indicator of the long-term trend of slow, positive growth in demand for the MSA.

Uncertainty about Norfolk's Population Trend

The differences between the Census Bureau's and Weldon Cooper's estimates of Norfolk's population provide an even starker contrast, as shown in the next figure. According the Census Bureau's model, Norfolk's population increased by 7,500 between 2000 and 2004, but then declined by 8,500 from 2004 to 2009. This suggests a short-lived revival in aggregate demand in Norfolk and then a resumption of population losses that rival the trend of the 1990s. In contrast, the Weldon Cooper estimates indicate that the city's population leveled out around

235,000 from 1998 to 2006 and then started to rebound afterwards. A growing region typically is good but tricky news for a distressed neighborhood or submarket, for strength increases demand pressures which can be an opportunity for struggling neighborhoods. By contrast, a soft or softening market results in increased inventory, giving far more options to buyers, driving prices down. The main competitive advantage a soft market typically has - affordability - gets weakened.

Uncertainty about the Impact of the Great Recession

The future is definitely uncertain, and has become even more so with the housing market bust that started in 2006-07 which triggered the Great Recession.

The price bubble that started in 2002 resulted in a dramatic run up in housing prices in the Virginia Beach MSA, well outpacing the national average, but the subsequent decline since 2007 has been on par with the US average. From 1990Q1 to the peak in 2007Q4, housing prices in the Virginia Beach MSA increased 172%, whereas prices in the US as a whole increased 131% to their peak in 2007Q1. The subsequent decline by 2009Q4 from these peaks was -9% for both areas, leaving most of the bubble market impact on prices in the Virginia Beach MSA intact.

Although this undoubtedly left many households who bought during the 2007 market peak "under water" with lower house values than their mortgage obligations, the major increase in prices from 2002 to 2005 remains intact overall. This influences the competitive position of Norfolk, which has a modestly priced housing market to begin with, in that the regional price trend apparently has not created such an excess of devalued homes that the result would work to the competitive disadvantage of many of Norfolk's neighborhoods. For the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, though, which are at the bottom third of value in Norfolk, it is not yet clear whether this is true.

There is some evidence the housing market is slowly rebounding. Old Dominion University's Regional Forecast 2010 documents that although a large inventory of for-sale new and existing homes persists, sales are increasing, unsold inventories are declining, and time on market is declining. The most promising and favorable trend is the decline in inventories of units in the moderate price categories, as shown in the next table. The strongest market, in terms of the length of time to absorb units, is for units priced between \$175,000 and \$225,000, which dropped to only 6.1 months by December 31, 2009. Additionally, the months of supply of the lower and next higher price categories are also below 7 months. Markets at these price levels were stronger than for prices above \$300,000 and substantially stronger than prices over \$521,000 across all four years shown. It is unclear if this is a sustained or temporary rebound.

Months of Supply of Single Family Existing Residential Homes (Detached, Attached) in Hampton Roads by Price Category on December 31 (July 31): 2006-2009

	2006	2007	2008	2009
All price categories	3.9 (4.0)	6.0 (6.4)	8.5 (8.9)	7.6 (10.1)
Less than \$175K	2.3 (1.9)	4.5 (3.7)	8.3 (7.4)	6.8 (8.9)
\$175K to \$225K	2.7 (2.9)	4.8 (4.8)	6.7 (6.6)	6.1 (8.0)
\$225K to \$300K	4.3 (4.6)	6.2 (6.7)	7.8 (9.0)	6.7 (8.8)
\$300K to \$521K	6.1 (6.8)	7.8 (9.6)	10.0 (11.1)	9.4 (13.1)
Greater than \$521K	11.2 (12.4)	13.9 (17.4)	20.4 (22.0)	23.4 (31.7)

Source: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information Deemed Reliable But not Guaranteed.

Even though housing prices in the Virginia Beach MSA have not fallen off steeply during the Great Recession, the timing and strength of a housing recovery will be heavily influenced by the supply of mortgage capital and the underwriting standards that emerge as the underlying financial framework of the housing market. The parameters for the mortgage market will be set nationally and internationally, and these parameters are currently unknown. In all likelihood, the availability and criteria for mortgage financing will be significantly more conservative than the market that supported the price bubble, and the housing recovery will probably be much less robust than previous recoveries. This could favor neighborhoods with a competitive supply of affordably priced units.

Norfolk's Net Migration Problem

Regardless of the impact of military movements on Norfolk's recent population estimates, Norfolk has a significant net migration problem as shown in the figure below. More people move from the city than move into the city, but the full impact of this net movement out of the city to neighboring communities has been masked by natural increase (births exceeding deaths) in the city. The city attracts young adults, but loses a significant number of people as they move into their thirties and forties, and as incomes increase. As a result, Norfolk loses households and their incomes to Chesapeake and Virginia Beach, which are its major housing market competitors within the region. Moving forward, population aging will reduce the excess of births over deaths and the impact of net migration will become more prominent.

The IRS place-to-place mobility files document the annual movement of federal tax filers to and from Norfolk as shown in the following table. From 2000 to 2008, Norfolk lost \$710M due to net out-migration of nearly 10,000 tax filers. **Not only does the city lose people and money, those who leave have higher Adjusted Gross Incomes than those who move in:** \$30,600 vs. \$25,900. Keeping more of the \$30,000 adjusted gross incomes on average should be attainable given the affordability of housing in Norfolk. The city's future relies less on the competition for the rich as it does in the competition for the lower middle and middle-income wage earner.


Norfolk's main competition is Virginia Beach and Chesapeake, but again this is not a matter of competing for the high income homebuyer but for the middle of the market, including the modest income renter.

The average Adjusted Gross Income for federal tax filers moving from Norfolk to Virginia Beach between 1999 and 2008 was \$30,400; and the average AGI for those moving to Chesapeake was \$30,500.

Capturing a larger share of households at and around this income level would boost housing demand for good quality market rate rental housing and affordable home ownership. Improving neighborhoods involves making them more competitive in retaining singles and families as their incomes increase to \$30,000 and over, which will also make them more competitive in attracting a competitive share of the regional market. The importance of competing better to retain and attract households with incomes of \$30,000 is a matter of economic sustainability: from 1999 to 2008 Norfolk lost more than \$240M in household purchasing power to Chesapeake and Virginia Beach.

Aggregate	Aggregate Annual Migration Flows To and From Norfolk, 1999-2008										
			orfolk city VA	Migrat	ion Out of N	Norfolk city VA	N	let Flows			
Migration Flow (From To) Area	# Returns	# Exmpts	Agg Adjusted Gross Income	# Returns	# Exmpts	Agg Adjusted Gross Income	net exmpts	Net Agg Adjusted Gross Income			
Total Mig - US &	100.010	101.010	0.704.404.070	440 407	040 007	# 0.000.500.400	47.045	(0040 477 444)			
Foreign - US	109,316 94,535	194,242 171,643	\$2,704,121,376 \$2,446,669,267	110,187 103,311	212,087 200,825	\$3,323,598,490 \$3,156,365,610	-17,845 -29,182	(\$619,477,114) (\$709,696,343)			
- Same State	49,889	91,844	\$1,370,789,567	56,848	109,251	\$1,767,347,833	-17,407	(\$396,558,266)			
- Different State	44,646	79,799	\$1,075,892,996	46,463	91,574	\$1,389,020,853	-11,775	(\$313,127,857)			
- Foreign	14,781	22,599	\$257,450,811	6,876	11,262	\$167,224,620	11,337	\$90,226,191			
Virginia Beach	24,731	45,905	\$682,968,720	26,988	51,153	\$820,540,495	-5,248	(\$137,571,775)			
Chesapeake	8,192	15,699	\$204,694,631	10,120	20,761	\$308,406,396	-5,062	(\$103,711,765)			
Portsmouth	4,151	8,377	\$94,102,526	4,596	9,147	\$121,735,693	-770	(\$27,633,167)			
Hampton	2,401	4,489	\$58,473,262	2,840	5,384	\$75,610,634	-895	(\$17,137,372)			
Newport News	2,331	4,529	\$57,388,711	2,528	4,905	\$63,742,845	-376	(\$6,354,134)			
Suffolk	1,111	2,097	\$32,925,354	1,798	3,931	\$78,864,877	-1,834	(\$45,939,523)			

Norfolk's competitive position in the housing market is further revealed in the residential location of people who work in Norfolk. The Longitudinal Employment Data (recently developed through a federal-state cooperative data mining venture) demonstrate that while Norfolk is a major center for employment within the region, it loses residential market share among workers as wages increase. The following map shows the Norfolk labor shed in 2008, with every dot representing the residential location of workers with jobs in Norfolk. The map and following table confirm the need to compete for the modest to middle income worker with a job in Norfolk but a home in Chesapeake or Virginia Beach.



The table shows the city's residential capture rate for people working in Norfolk based on wage level. Boosting the capture of the bottom and middle wage workers by a few points would enhance the city's competitive position. As indicated by the steep drop in residential share of workers above \$3,333/month (\$40,000 per year), Norfolk loses market share as workers' incomes increase. Competing for a larger residential share of the \$40-50K worker is a reasonable goal, particular for single-earner households.

Table x. Place of Residence for Primary Jobs in Norfolk, 2008										
				E	arnings F	er Month				
	Total Primary Jobs		\$1,250/mo or Less			/mo to 3/mo	> \$3,333/mo			
	Count	Share	Count	Share	Count	Share	Count	Share		
Total Primary Jobs, Norfolk	127,725	100.0%	26,703	100.0%	51,289	100.0%	49,733	100.0%		
Workers living in:										
Norfolk city	36,819	28.8%	9,597	35.9%	16,810	32.8%	10,412	20.9%		
Virginia Beach city	35,023	27.4%	5,794	21.7%	13,375	26.1%	15,854	31.9%		
Chesapeake city	18,027	14.1%	3,073	11.5%	6,551	12.8%	8,403	16.9%		
Portsmouth city	7,043	5.5%	1,567	5.9%	3,249	6.3%	2,227	4.5%		
Hampton city	4,356	3.4%	935	3.5%	1,823	3.6%	1,598	3.2%		
Newport News city	3,646	2.9%	871	3.3%	1,527	3.0%	1,503	3.0%		
Suffolk city	3,517	2.8%	646	2.4%	1,368	2.7%	1,248	2.5%		
Fairfax County	1,502	1.2%	412	1.5%	477	0.9%	613	1.2%		
Chesterfield County	1,181	0.9%	245	0.9%	NA		549	1.1%		
Isle of Wight County	1,148	0.9%	NA		420	0.8%	520	1.0%		
Richmond city	856	0.7%	178	0.7%	295	0.6%	383	0.8%		
All Other Locations	14,607	11.4%	3,385	12.7%	5,394	10.5%	6,423	12.9%		
Source: US Bureau of Census	, LED data b	ase								

Norfolk Housing Market Shares and Demand Projections

Understanding the dynamics of population change, particularly migration, is fundamental to understanding demographic trends affecting housing demand. The youngest ten-year cohort forming households, and thus having an impact on housing demand, is aged 15-24. Although only a few teenagers form independent households, early household formation starts with this group.

The following table provides ten-year cohort survival rates calculated from 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census data, 1998 and 2008 population estimates, and the Virginia Employment Commission population projections for 2010 and 2020. Each ratio shows the size of the age-cohort at the end of the ten-year period relative to its size at the beginning of the period when the cohort was ten-years younger. The survivor ratios reflect the combined impacts of deaths and net migration on the cohort. Increases in a cohort can only be due to net in-migration. Net migration is the driving factor behind changes in most cohorts, as death rates remain relatively low until age 65 and over.

For example, the survival ratio for the 15-24 year old cohort shows that this cohort increased by 62.7% from 1990 to 2000 and by 54.8% from 1998 to 2008, all of which would be due to net in-migration of young adults into Norfolk. If survival ratios increase over time, Norfolk is becoming a more attractive location for the age group; if survival ratios decrease, Norfolk is becoming less attractive. The decline in the survival ratio for this age group indicates that the city attracted proportionately fewer young adults between 1998 and 2008 than it did from 1990 to 2000, probably due to underlying changes in the regional economy. This shift was anticipated (but overstated) in the VEC projections for 2010.

Although Norfolk is attracting fewer adults in the youngest cohort, it retained more of the next four cohorts (25-34, 35-44, and 45-54). Although these cohorts continue to experience significant net out-migration, the city became more competitive in retaining these age groups in the latter period compared to the earlier period.

For the most part, these trends are also reflected in the VEC projections but the highlighted projections can be adjusted to better reflect the most recent patterns. (Adjusted projections were developed for this project in making the housing demand forecast presented below.)

The table also demonstrates that as cohorts get older, they start to exit Norfolk—although the city is becoming more attractive and retaining a higher percentage of most cohorts. The key competitive problem is the city's attractiveness to the 25-34 and 35-44 age cohorts. The survival ratios indicate that to date these age groups get depleted due to net out-migration. Boosting these survival ratios to 80% or higher would reflect a continued positive shift in the city's competitiveness in the residential market and would stimulate demand for housing in the city. The higher survival ratios above age 45 indicate that if the city could retain more of its population into the mid-forties, it could stabilize and increase housing demand overall. If the city does not become more competitive for people in their late 20's, 30's and early 40's, it faces a demographic time-bomb. Unless the city becomes more competitive it could face significantly shrinking residential demand.

10-yr cohort survival ratios										
	1990-00	1998-08	2000-10	2010-20						
15-24	1.627	1.548	1.502	1.439						
25-34	0.572	0.680	0.699	0.663						
35-44	0.644	0.762	0.817	0.821						
45-54	0.813	0.884	0.850	0.875						
55-64	0.855	0.803	0.856	0.839						
65-74	0.770	0.752	0.729	0.711						
75-84	0.580	0.718	0.516	0.525						
85+	0.339	0.328	0.352	0.514						

Based on population projections adjusted to reflect the trends in the most recent Weldon Cooper population estimates, we forecast a stable aggregate demand for housing in Norfolk for 87,400 occupied dwelling units from 2010 through 2020. Due to aging of the population, ownership demand is projected to increase by approximately 1,000 occupied units from 41,500 in 2010 to 42,500 by 2020. The city's share of the overall regional (MSA) market is forecast to drop for 13.8% in 2010 to 12.8% by 2020, as residential demand outside the city continues to grow.

The demand projection isolates the housing demand segments where Norfolk has higher shares of the regional market, showing where the city demonstrates better competitive advantage. The city's highest market shares are for:

- newly forming households aged 15-24 (across all household types and income segments);
- married-couple families in the 25-34 age group with incomes below \$42,700 and in the 35 to 54 age group with incomes below \$32,700;
- single-parent families with incomes below \$65,300 (although shares among 35-54 year old householders in the \$42,700-65,300 income range dip—possibly reflecting sensitivity to school choices);
- singles and other unrelated individuals across all incomes.

The demand projections also isolate the demand segments where the city's competitive shares are lower:

- married-couple families over the age of 35 with incomes above \$32,700; and.
- single-parent families over the age of 35 with incomes above \$\$65,300.

The city's market shares rarely drop below 7% for demand segments, but this is about half of its overall proportion of the metro market. Although improvements across all of the underrepresented markets would increase demand for housing, the key segments that could be attracted in greater number are most likely among modest income families between the ages of 35 and 54, including married-couples with incomes between \$33,000-65,000 and single-parent families with incomes from \$43,000 to \$65,000. These market segments could be increased with improved neighborhoods that have affordable housing, stable ownership opportunities and good quality rental properties, competitive schools and urban service amenities.

Greater Park Place (Lamberts Point, Kensington, Park Place, and Villa Heights)

Based on data from the 4th quarter of 2008, 4,221 workers lived in the four neighborhoods. As shown below, most of these workers were between the ages of 31 and 54, and 78% had primary jobs (the highest paying job for an individual worker during the year) providing monthly earnings of \$3,333 (\$40,000 per year) or less.

The top four job sectors for workers in the neighborhoods (nearly 50% of all workers) are retail trade, health care and social assistance, accommodation and food services, and educational services, followed by administrative and building services. It bears noting that neighborhood residents are employed across all economic sectors.

Final Report to City of Norfolk, VA

Park Place Area Profile Report, 2008	Count	Share
Total Primary Jobs	4,221	100.0%
Total i lillary oobs	7,221	100.070
Jobs by Worker Age		
Age 30 or younger	1,253	29.7%
Age 31 to 54	2,309	54.7%
Age 55 or older	659	15.6%
Jobs by Earnings Paid		
\$1,250 per month or less	1,361	32.2%
\$1,251 to \$3,333 per month	1,925	45.6%
More than \$3,333 per month	935	22.2%
Jobs by Industry Type (2-digit NAICS)		
Retail Trade	537	12.7%
Health Care and Social Assistance	528	12.5%
Accommodation and Food Services	505	12.0%
Educational Services	429	10.2%
Adm & Building Support Services	328	7.8%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services	298	7.1%
Manufacturing	244	5.8%
Construction	215	5.1%
Finance and Insurance	169	4.0%
Transportation and Warehousing	156	3.7%
Public Administration	142	3.4%
Wholesale Trade	140	3.3%
Information	108	2.6%
Management of Companies and Enterprises	97	2.3%
Other	325	7.7%
Data Source		
US Census Bureau, LED OnTheMap Origin-Destination Data	abase (Beginning of C	Quarter
Employment, 2nd Quarter 2008)		

As shown in the following map, neighborhood residents work throughout the metropolitan area, but with significant clusters in the Norfolk Central Business District, the hospital complex area, and ODU. Secondary clusters of job locations are along Virginia Beach Boulevard and Northampton Boulevard, around the intersection of I64 and I264, and the Greenbrier Market Center area within the area bounded by Military Highway (Rt 13), Battlefield Boulevard (Rt 168), and Kempsville Road (Rt 190). Workers with job locations in central Norfolk are an important market target for expanding demand in the four neighborhoods that comprise Greater Park Place. [Preparing a map showing the residential locations for central Norfolk jobs in the \$25k-\$40k range. This will help identify the locations that Greater Park Place competes with as a

place to live for central Norfolk workers.]

Work Locations for Greater Park Place Neighborhood Residents 143 13 Newport News Hampton 152 415 351 67 10 337 0 Smithfield 258 32 135 Portsmo 8 Mello 410 414 603 125 Suffolk 165 10 Chesapeake 337 00 460 13 58 13 615

In order to help gauge the competitive position of the Greater Park Place neighborhoods, a "stress" index was calculated based on the percent of houses with mortgages (reflecting access to mortgage capital), the percent of foreclosed units, the 90-day vacancy rate, the percent of high cost loans, the percent of units built before 1950, and the median value of units. All of the measures were standardized with higher values indicating greater stress and lower values indicating lower stress. The stress index is the sum of the six measures standardized across all the census tracts in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake and Virginia Beach, as these are the locations of most of the neighborhoods in competition with Greater Park Place.

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The stress index has a range of -8.5 (the least stressed census tract) to 19.5 (the most stressed; although these is an extreme outlier as the second highest index value is 9.2).

Portsmouth has six of the top ten stressed tracts and half of the top 20. Norfolk has three tracts in the top ten. The two main census tracts that represent Greater Park Place (tracts 29 and 27) are ranked 13th and 14th with stress index values of 6.5 and 6.4, while tract 25 (which includes the area north of ODU) is ranked 31st with an index value of 4.8. The average stress index value for Norfolk is 1.60 and the average rank is 86.

The index is obviously an imperfect measure of neighborhood stress, but it helps clarify that improvements are needed in Greater Park Place to enhance its competitiveness.

It is also clear that this can be done without sacrificing affordability—the rankings are virtually identical when median value is excluded and many tracts with median values (2000\$) ranging from \$80,000 to \$110,000 have much more competitive stress scores.

The mortgage ratio (percent of units with mortgages) in Greater Park Place is around 30%. Although this is well below the mean of 57% for all of the neighborhoods in the four cities, the amount of rental housing in the area is also much higher.

Assuring access to mortgage capital will be critical in maintaining adequate demand, and moving the mortgage ratio toward 50% should be feasible. The high cost loan ratio reflects the lower incomes of residents and at 47-52% is well above the four-city average of 29%. The impact of the recession and new underwriting standards that emerge will make high cost loans much more difficult to acquire, which will impede the flow of mortgage capital. As the recovery expands, it will be critically important to monitor and promote market worthy access to mortgage capital.

The foreclosure rate was higher relative to the four-city average (7.1 to 7.8% compared to 4.1%) but again the levels are not extreme. Although many modest wage workers have been displaced during this recession, opportunities to increase Greater Park Place's market share for central Norfolk workers should rebound as the recovery starts to increase hiring, particularly for workers in the employment sectors previous highlighted.

The proportion of housing units built before 1950 is particularly high in tracts 29 and 27 (68% and 60%) and underscores the need to focus on maintenance and upgrading of the housing stock, particularly to improve its competitiveness in the contemporary market. Improvements should include routine maintenance; kitchen, bath and closet features that respond to current demand; and enhancements to structural functionality, particularly energy efficiency. Given its access to major job locations, Greater Park Place could leverage the substantial national interest in energy efficiency and sustainability into significant investments in retro-greening the housing stock. Additional opportunities should be identified for strategic in-fill, refill construction that reinforces market demand for existing units.

Residential vacancies are a key signal of stress, reflecting weak demand and if very high can signal to home seekers and property owners that investment in the neighborhood is not warranted. The 90-day vacancy rate used in the stress index was higher in tracts 29 and 27 (5.0% and 3.4%) than the four-city average (1.2%), but lower in tract 25 (0.9%). The following charts review data provided by HUD on vacancy rates through to the 1st quarter of 2010 based on data provided by the US Postal Service. Census tracts 27 and 29 are combined to reflect Greater Park Place (tract 25 includes additional neighborhoods and was excluded from these calculations). The data plotted for Norfolk are for the balance of the city excluding tracts 27 and 29.

The overall residential vacancy rate (ResVacRate) for Greater Park Place has been several points higher than the rest of Norfolk since early 2007 when the data series begins. The vacancy rate in the neighborhood jumped 100 basis points (1 percentage point) during 2008 and then again in the 4th quarter of 2009. The data for the 1st quarter of 2010 show a substantial jump of over 200 basis points, compared to an increase in the rest of the city of only 50 basis points. Unless a market rebound is genuinely underway, this is a troubling sign.

According to HUD, "no-stats are addresses that have been more or less abandoned or addresses that are under construction and are not yet ready to be occupied."

The no-stats rate spiked dramatically to 7.4% in Greater Park Place at the beginning of 2008, perhaps reflecting the foreclosure crisis (as noted earlier the foreclosure rate was over 7%) and jumped again in the 4th quarter of 2009 to 7.9%. Most recently, the rate dropped 210 basis points in the 1st quarter of 2010 to 5.8%, either indicating removal of addresses or their reentry in the market. If the latter, the 2010Q1 jump in the residential vacancy rate in Greater Park Place could reflect units placed back on the market and awaiting occupancy. If this is excess inventory brought back onto the market in anticipation of absorption, it could point to a recovery in the Greater Park Place housing market.

The trend in the residential absorption rate for Greater Park Place jumped 700 basis points in 2009Q1, one quarter after a similar spike in absorption in the rest of Norfolk. The residential absorption rate is the percent of units classified as vacant in the previous quarter that became occupied in the reported quarter. Obviously an absorption rate of the magnitude that occurred in 2009Q1 (over 19%) would be hard to sustain, as it quickly starts to deplete excess inventory. Over the next four quarters the absorption rate has stayed above 5% and has been moving upward in the last two quarters, with the most recent level exceeding the absorption rate for the balance of the city.

Another measure of a shift toward an improvement in the housing market is the long-term vacancy rate (the percent of vacant units unoccupied for 12+ months). This rate more than tripled in Greater Park Place at the start of the recession, peaking at over 70% in 2008Q2, when it started a steady decline to 2009Q2. The rate hit another peak at 60% f or Greater Park Place in 2009Q4 and then dropped to 33% in 2010Q1, the lowest level since 2007Q4.

The more recent favorable trends in the residential market were not shared in the commercial property market. Over half of the commercial addresses in Greater Park Place were vacant in 2010Q1, nearly twice the commercial vacancy rate for the rest of the city. Absent a strong recovery in commercial property markets, the amount of excess inventory in Greater Park Place could negatively impact the residential recovery. Monitoring vacant commercial properties and shielding residential markets from damage should be considered in planning the revitalization of Greater Park Place.

In conclusion, the trends underscore the need for good planning to enhance residential areas and do so through improved infill. The market timing for having any significant leveraging impact to positively shock the market is probably 2+ years away.

Appendices

C - Metrics

The primary measures by which traditional housing and community development efforts are evaluated tend to focus on outputs and on need. We strongly encourage the residents and stakeholders of Greater Park Place put in place alternative systems that are organized more along the lines of demand based on choices and competition and on outcomes in the market, as follows:

Traditional	Recommended	Notes	Why the Shift?
Need	Demand	Need measures the gap between cost and affordability	The affordability gap does not address market weakness
Outputs	Outcomes	Outputs are typically items like the number of homes built or the number of units delivered or the number of meetings held.	Outputs <i>can</i> lead to good outcomes, but not necessarily.

We recommend that all Greater Park Place stakeholders adopt an *outcome orientation*. We subscribe to the axiom noted on page 4 that *what you measure is what you get*. If you measure meetings and meeting attendance that is what you will get. If you measure affordability that is what you will get. The problem to solve for in Greater Park Place is not a shortage of meetings, and not a shortage of affordable housing. It is diminished demand and subsequent disinvestment and resulting distress. The work of revitalization is to grow demand and this is done by building on existing assets and protecting investments along the way to justify further investment and confidence that things are improving.

The following are the outcomes that we recommend be worked towards:


- Market Values (stabilization of values and rising home prices)
- -Ownership Demand (shortened time on market and improved list to sales ratios)
- Rental Demand (decreased rental vacancy rates among HHs at or above 80% AMI)
- Physical Condition (increased average building condition scores)
- Resident Satisfaction (as measured by surveys we recommend be developed)
- -Safety (reductions in crime)
- Diversity (deconcentration of poverty levels to 15% or lower)
- Land Value to Improvement Ratios (higher land values indicate competitiveness regionally)

In short, these are the only measure that count. If vacant lots are being developed but the above metrics are not changing, then the development of those lots is not triggering a market improvement. If meetings are being held but the property values are not stable and rising, then the meetings are not useful. All efforts have to be pointed towards stabilizing and strengthening property values. Police efforts. Code enforcement efforts. Urban reforestry efforts. Community organizing efforts. Norfolk as a municipality and residents as stakeholders must begin to see police work as contributing to safety but with the aim of triggering market health, tree canopy installation and maintenance as contributing to livability but with the aim of helping to trigger market strength, civic league meetings as helping to provide a forum for dialogue but mainly as a tool to help grow market stability.

Appendices

D - Core Values and a Migration to a New Self-Defined, Competitive Normal

The below 11 charts were complete by residents on May 22 in Lamberts Point at an all community meeting where the aim was for residents stakeholders to being articulating their core values through a structure linking capacity to market.



From	#2					To						
What's 'No	What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal											
	WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY	THE MESSAGE BEING SENT	WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE	WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE	THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND	WHAT PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE						
OUR CAPACITY	 Loitering, unsupervised children, people taking care of their yards, loud music, bad schools 		 Some residents are uneducated; some residents are intimidating 	Clean neighborhood, clean streets	We care about our neighborhood!!	 They can raise a famil here, it's a neighborly →place 						
OUR CONDITION		 People don't care; This is a changing community 	- "Who wants to live there?"	– Continuous stretches of "nice" homes	- We care about our community	Others take pride in their property						
OUR IMAGE	DepressingDiversityUnemployment	- Hope for change - Complacency	 People of Park Place accept the current → 'status quo' 	A cheerful desirable place	This is a safe place→	- I could live here; this is my type of neighborhood						
THE MARKET	- Affordability, centrally-located	- Attractive to 'urban pioneers'	- A shaky investment	 Stable, competitive, desirable, great location 	Come to Park Place→	- It's a good investment →						

What's 'Normal' Today?

WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY BEING SENT BELIEVE WILL SEE WE'LL SEND WILL BELIEVE

WHAT PEOPLE	THE MESSAGE	WHAT PEOPLE	WHAT PEOPLE	THE MESSAGE	WHAT PEOPLE	
WILL BELIEVE	WE'LL SEND	WILL SEE	BELIEVE	BEING SENT	SEE TODAY	
his place is safe /e do not tolerate trash, rime or drugs	– We are involved!!	35 active civic league members per neighborhood Children engaged in productive activities Better pay, shorter day	- Not safe r' - Tolerate trash - 'OK' with crime	We don't care; we're disinterested; this is a 'pool neighborhood, the glass is half-empty	Some involvement People walk past trash Low to mid-civic league involvement	OUR
ositive work is in progress legative activities will be topped	 Parents talk to each other; 		More control needed Fearful of setting standard Negative activities are stronger than positive	Lack of concern Lack of participation Discouraces purchases Parents aren't involved	- Fair on profile score - "Ghetto" standard on City 5 lots vs. downtown standard - Unsupervised children, adults with 40oz, teens everywhere	CONDITIONS
here are rules here	Come for choice Media reporting positive things vs. negative		More control needed Fearful of setting standard Negative activities are stronger than positive	e Mixed messages - Opportunity for some - Come for affordability vs. choice - People are not winning - Media reinforces negative, ignores the positive	Negative, depressing, sense of hopelessness (One person can't do this alone)	UUR
his is a very good, ery safe neighborhood	- Buy a home here!	– High market values	Bad neighborhood Unsure, uncertain Is it worth the risk?	– DO NOT BUY HERE	– Low market value – Demolition needed	
ny sale ne	→			→ DO NOT BUY HERE		

From #4

What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal						
	WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY	THE MESSAGE BEING SENT	WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE	WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE	THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND	WHAT PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE
OUR CAPACITY	Negative: throwing trash on street cars being worked on in street; sofas, drugs being sold on 28th, walking in street vs. on sidewalk Positive: people working in yards	t; – People don't care – It's a low-class place	 It's unsafe to walk the neighborhood 	 People who work in their yards, pick up trash on street, fixing up exterior of their property, trash cans are pulled in from street; neighborhood beautificatio projects. 	People care Friendly neighborhood Diverse socioeconomic This community is INVOLVED!	A good place to live Safe for the elderly, children, everyone Great retail and commercia district
OUR CONDITIONS	Rundown houses & apartments; sofas, mattresses left on porches and curbs Improvements Too many vacant homes	- Low-income; people don't care - The slumlords are in charge -	This is the armpit of Norfolk e – It's full of crime and →drugs	Houses with fresh paint, nicely landscaped yards, clean streets, safe parks	Community standards are good Houses are well-maintained	A thriving community
OUR IMAGE	- 31st and up = nice; street lamps, well-lit - 30th and lower = bad, with pockets of good	- Part of the neighborhood is people who care - Lower Park Place is still - scary	 Negative: low-income renters Positive: a diamond in the rough 	The historic district it was meant to be A family-friendly place	- Residents care - There's no tolerance for crime	→
THE MARKET	- Not a good investment	– Don't buy here	Won't see a return on your investment	– A good investment	– BUY, BUY, BUY!	They will have a safe place to live that will increase in value
		→	→		→	→

From #5

What's 'No	ormal' Today?				Defining	g Our New Normal
	WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY	THE MESSAGE BEING SENT	WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE	WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE	THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND	WHAT PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE
OUR CAPACITY	Pockets of loitering People dropping trash and litter Late night hanging out, noise, car honking,	No jobs; nobody cares; nothing to do People don't care about their neighbors; there's little potential or hope	Bad neighborhood to live Apathy, disrepair, people desperate measures Believe it's ok to behave way you want	are picking up trash (even if its	A good place to consider living A great place to enjoy the company of your neighbors	- Criminal element is deterred ; →
OUR CONDITIONS	Bars on business windows, homes in disrepair Some very nice houses, new construction	High crime rate Low income Some interest in investment		- Clean neighborhood - Houses being repaired - New businesses - More new construction	Visually appealing→	- Worth investment; no hesitation to buy
OUR IMAGE	- Preserving what is good - Physical energy is both positive and negative - up and coming, a place of interest, worth restoring, dangerous at night, fighting a losing battle, no businesses, used to thrive	→	- Low standard	– Friendly and safe – A destination community	Safe Spend money Good investment; worth investing in	Good place for children, family friendly We will not tolerate bad behavior, crime There are high standards, we stick and work together
THE MARKET	A lot of transition (rentals, students) Predominantly African American	→	→	More diverse More homeowners and more involved renters	→	A physically restored neighborhood, pride of the community has been renewed A neighborhood of choice and good schools.

From #6 To What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal WHAT PEOPLE WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY BEING SENT BELIEVE WILL SEE WE'LL SEND WILL BELIEVE Low capacity
 People dropping trash
 Individuals beautifying It's ok to do whatever you want even if it's negative People investing time and energy - Working hard as a community pays off OUR CAPACITY homes
- Individual efforts OUR - Boarded up, vacant homes - Lots full of trash
CONDITIONS - Inappropriate behavior - Poorly kept rentals - High crime - Children unsupervised with no place to go - Crime is #1 problem
- Low incomes & poverty
- prevalent
- Business owners think its ok
to sit on properties, waiting
for change vs. being a
catalyst for change Physical conditions and overall health of community is improving – Great homes - Neighborhood mood improving Houses in good repair, etc. Not where I go
 Not where I want to live
 Long-term potential
 Non-desirable
 Attracting young professionals - Bad part of town – This is a place to be Up and coming
 Unified community - Health, wealth, happiness OUR IMAGE - Undesirable area Pockets of loitering
 People dropping trash and litter
 Late night hanging out, noise, car honking, – Risky - Increased stability Community of choice.
 Diverse economically
 Diverse people – Unstable - Increased home values THE MARKET

From #7

What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal

	WHAT PEOPLE	THE MESSAGE	WHAT PEOPLE	WHAT PEOPLE	THE MESSAGE	WHAT PEOPLE
	SEE TODAY	BEING SENT	BELIEVE	WILL SEE	WE'LL SEND	WILL BELIEVE
CAPACITY	playing, having fun, cooking out, construction – Yelling, littering, prostitution, not	 We don't resepct each other as neighbors No discipline We like to have fun 	- Not much - Survival	Beautiful neighborhood People riding bikes, kids playing People being respectful of neighbors	Love for one another We are strong and can make change	We have high standards Personal value
	watching kids, drugs, alcohol, yelling at each other, working on cars	neighborhood		 No yelling, no drugs Socializing, people talking to each other, people watching kids Kids not standing around 		
OUR CONDITIONS	buildings, trash on street, broken windows, unstable fences, broken	We don't care, are lazy, it's not safe, only a few people care	, – Don't take care of the neighborhood – It's not worth taking care of	Clean streets Flowers in gardens Grass cut and edged	We respect and care about our community	Community is in good shape Quality living
	bottles, chipped paing – Bright flowers, cut grass, landscaping lights	→		Painted steps, clean yards (junk free) Working cars in driveways	→	→
OUR		Our areas are worst places to live People are scared, we accept bad behavior	_	Neighborly, neighborhood People communicate with each other Prettier buildings	We are clean, neat, We care for others' homes and children	- We care
IIVIAGE			→	We care about our image		→
THE		Not a good place to buy or invest Don't live there. It's not a good place.	– Don't invest	- Housing values are up - Stable market - People are looking to buy	– This is a good place to live	- This is a good place to invest
						_

From #8 To What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE WHAT PEOPLE THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY BEING SENT BELIEVE WILL SEE WE'LL SEND WILL BELIEVE Some believe the neighborhood can change, but not enough - Lots of issues Working, caring community – Working community Neighborhood changing; moving on up OUR CAPACITY - Fair, but needs improving - Lots of improvement needed. - An understanding of conditions that need improvement Property values increasing
 Neighbors know each other
 Neighbors working towards
 agreed upon vision – Poor CONDITIONS - One of improving each year, - The place to be getting safer and safer - Unsafe - Safe community - Unsafe – Unsafe OUR IMAGE Not goodProperty values very lowProperty sells cheaply Property values have increased, qulity of life is good!! - Housing market good - Improving THE MARKET

What's 'Normal' Today? Defining Our New Normal WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY WHAT PEOPLE WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND THE MESSAGE WHAT PEOPLE BEING SENT BELIEVE WILL BELIEVE - We are building capacity, on the other hand it is not a - No vision of improvement place to live - Lack of community togetherness, unity - Improved housing stock
- Beautification projects
- People are neighborly
- People caring
- People engaged, a pro-active - Demand quality education Improved housing stock Beautification projects Very few think we have Community works OUR Very lew tilling we have capacity
 Very little effort to break down barriers
 Some people making a change, moving community forward together - No fear CAPACITY place to live - Dangerous, opportunity neighborhood - Excellent- looking properties - Family friendly - Clean streets - Residents are held to high standards (home owners and landlords) Beautification Beautification
 Higher property values
 People taking ownership
 No litter
 Well-maintained lawns and change; change is not easy for everyone - Clean streets vards A place to transition but not - Not taking ownership and responsibility responsibility - No ownership - Determination to improve - Low self-esteem There will be no change
People believe others'
perception
People lead with actions and not words alone. A good place to live
A safe neighborhood;
child-friendly
No graffiti - Strong Community - Desirable place - No slackers - Community with a positive identity OUR IMAGE - Increased property values - Competitive neighborhood - Expensive - Increased lending - Increased occupancy - No for sale signs THE MARKET

From	#10					To
What's 'Nor	rmal' Today?				Defining.	g Our New Normal
	WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY	THE MESSAGE BEING SENT - Realize potential	WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE – there is a change, but no	WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE - High potential	THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND - We care!	WHAT PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE
OUR CAPACITY	- 4/10	Aware of faults A handful want change	jumpers Still crime	 - Right potential - Positive media attention - Word of mouth, shoe leath 	 You missed out 	→
OUR CONDITIONS	Loitering Drinking in pupblic Littering No respect for traffic Furniture in yards Friendly courteous people	ApathyOverwhelmed	- Negative, but changing	Better maintained properti Small independent retail Shy away corporate	es – Beautification – Unique – Historic	→
OUR IMAGE	Unwelcoming Blight, crime Pockets of progress / a chance to improve	- So - so →	- Improvingslowly - Good location	Rise of the creative class Clean, consistent Diverse Hip community Self-reliant	Welcoming Excited about transition Involved and connected	→
THE MARKET	Affordable Shifting to a younger demographic Want to attract creatives Want to attract retail	- Potential gentrification	- Good investment	– "The place to be"	You missed out! Get in line. →	→

From #11

What's 'Normal' Today?

Defining Our New Normal

	WHAT PEOPLE SEE TODAY	THE MESSAGE BEING SENT	WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVE	WHAT PEOPLE WILL SEE	THE MESSAGE WE'LL SEND	WHAT PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE
OUR CAPACITY	Getting rid & refurbishing old houses Building new homes Churches Less loitering School and recreation - new LP recenter	- Turning things around - A good community to live in	– LP is up coming community – Community is safe – OMG - bad area → Opportunities are opening up	Less crime Less dilapidated homes New homes & Rec Center	Landlords should not expect students (tenants) do do upkeep Landlords should hold tenants sesponsible for property damage	Community working together for change: homeowners, renters and businesses
OUR CONDITIONS	Community on brink of disaster to a community of good standing Police are working hard to keep community Block security People want to be involved but won't come to meetings	being improved - See how you can be improved by community and the community can help you	Build a new rec center Opening a police precinct on Hampton & 42nd Widened 26th street	Build more homes Fill vacant lots with homes	Work closely with city officials to keep neighborhoods & properties within standards	Community working together for change: homeowners, renters and businesses
OUR IMAGE	- Communith that has bloomed over the years - New homes and refurbishing - Pride in property and community - Working on reducing loitering - Working with landlords and businesses	– Safe to visit LP – Landlords repair dilapidated properties	- We are a caring community	All new community and a better place to live. Less crime	- Come on back - Stay if you haven't left - Get involved - The company of the co	Community working together for change: homeowners, renters and businesses
THE MARKET	Renters say rent is too high Homeowners need to get involved No stores	Civic league asks landlords to attend meetings to provide updates and get suggestions		– Value is way up	- Good investment	Community working together for change: homeowners, renters and businesses

E - Themes for the Residents of Greater Park Place to Consider

	Themes	Challenge
Isolation v Assimilation	The community needs to come to a consensus about what kind of a neighborhood does it want to live in, in terms of how marketable (appealing) it is to two particular groups: those who can afford to leave, and those not living there now who might be induced to come in. Among its options are to continue along the path of intentionally and self-destructively continuing to keep the neighborhood as unappealing as possible to these two groups	Adaptive
Building on Strengths	The community will have to wrestle with the aspiration of transforming the neighborhoods to a healthy condition in an era of exceptionally scarce resources. With a thin relationship with the Norfolk corporate and philanthropic world to begin with, and those sectors (especially philanthropic) financially pressed, and with city revenue and spending capacity anemic, the time for self-reliance will have never been more paramount. The good news is most of the foundation building work of a health neighborhood is inexpensive. The challenge is that it requires the community and its partners to make unpopular choices, for scarece resources invested most wisely mean an intense deployment of dollars and time in some areas, and little to none in others.	Adaptive
Changing Direction	Few parts of the four neighborhoods have not been affected profoundly by forty years of flawed Norfolk city policies. Some policies had pernicious intentions, spoken and otherwise. Others had the best of intentions. But the outcomes in both cases were and remain a weakened market. This principally traces to two policies and program flaws. First is a failure to 'see' the challenge as a demand challenge, and thus to seek improvements not by changing underlying conditions but by adding or fixing supply (leading to a further weakened market). This affects police policy, community development policy, and planning policy. Second by treating the community as just a community in need comprised of no more or less and marginal poor families who need. The entire approach to a conservation district: to hold onto what we have, fails the most important requirement of a healthy market: growing confidence to keep and attract families who can afford to be elsewhere. "Conservation" is an inherently defensive posture in a world where defensive thinking weakens the very basis for market health. The NRHA's defensive, output oriented approach, instead of the needed offensive, outcome based approach, must cease. The challenge is to reorient the hardwiring of the city and the redevelopment authority in tandem with reorienting the software of the community.	Adaptive
Partnership	There are are three badly needed partnerships around which healthy neighborhoods can take root in <i>greater Park Place</i> . 1. Within the community, bridging the group of residents holding the market together and behaving in ways that create value and wealth, and those whose problem behaviors undermine wealth creation 2. Between the community and the city (Police, NRHA, and City Hall) 3. Between the community and the wider market Partnerships will have to be forged out of newly developed common agreements, such as standards, a demand-orientation, and market health	Adaptive
Market Preparation	The market challenge can be compared to the NBA draft. The NBA is not just looking for athletes with a good jump shot and great fitness. These athletes also need to be 6'6" to really get consideration. Though there are exceptions, the 5'8' athlete with a great mind is not commanding a high price on the open market. For the neighborhoods of <i>greater Park Place</i> it is essential that all work be <u>re-oriented</u> towards creating a healthy market dynamic, that is one where what the market wants the neighborhood is providing. That means all systems have to be pointed mainly in this direction.	Adaptive
New Normal	The prevailing <i>norms</i> are not healthy; they are self destructive. They cement a status quo wohse chief outcomes are low wealth and crime, each that feed off the other. A new norm is needed, one that will evolve and be generative, but which will depend on being managed and nurtured.	Adaptive
Structure	Structure will be needed to manage the evolution from the current norm to a new normal. This structure will have to focus on creating outcomes that are equitable as well as economically viable, sustainable as well as quality of life-enriching. This structure will likely come from a formal organization dedicated to achieving such balances, and focused on wealth creation and use.	Technical and Adaptive

Themes: Isolation v Assimilation

The hard work of addressing the wealth v culture dilemma

To the wider Norfolk market who experiences Greater Park Place through the media, by driving along Granby, Hampton, Colley, or 26th or 27th, it's a place that projects disorder. They conclude the neighborhoods are unsafe - which in many ways they are - and they avoid them. By avoiding them they push down housing prices, increase affordability, and discourage healthy investment.

What is the disorder that the Greater Park Place neighborhoods projects?

It is both social and physical in dimension.

On these streets - not to mention interior blocks in worse condition - it's evident in widespread appearance of junk and trash, vacant lots, decaying and boarded up homes. It's signaled by loitering teenagers, verbal harassment of women, and the drug trade. As Wesley Skogan has written, "what these conditions have in common is that they signal a breakdown of the local social order [leaving the market to conclude] that they can no longer expect people to act in a civil fashion in public places.³² Not able to consistently expect people to act in a civil fashion, the market avoids Greater Park Place.

By avoiding places people are wary of, their decision to go and invest elsewhere reduces demand. Amid constant supply, prices subsequently fall. Two severe consequences result.

First, as the neighborhoods become cheaper, their value diminishes and strong families disinvest or leave altogether .

Second, as strong families disinvest or leave, the community is deprived of their energy and financial resources. Indeed other often nearby neighborhoods become the beneficiaries of their investments, widening the gap between Greater Park Place and adjoining neighborhoods with otherwise similar (if not the same) characteristics (location, architecture, urban design).

The decline that results is very difficult to address. While some components of disorder are plain violations of the law (and thus enforceable through conventional policing), others such as noise, trash, building maintenance, loitering youths, are not. And still others (disturbing the peace, vagrancy), while illegal, don't have individual victims so much as collective consequences.³³

The challenge for the residents of Greater Park Place is to address this disorder, for it "erodes what control residents can maintain over local events and conditions."³⁴ It undermines predictability in the market, pushing strong families out and discouraging strong families from moving in. It is the principle instrument maintaining the community's isolation.

Because disorder is not a problem that can be cured by just more cops, or more codes enforced more rigorously, we have outlined strategy to revitalize Greater Park Place that will include policing, but hinge on other actions - namely community organizing and the establishment of community-based standards.

At the root of what the Greater Park Place community must address is how much of the prevailing disorder is a part of the culture of what it means to be from Greater Park Place; how much of the behaviors define *who* residents are. This becomes paramount and has two parts that require attention.


The first is the degree to which the *people with the problem* (the noisy, those who loiter, those who scream obscenities, those who don't take care of their properties) feel continuing those behaviors is necessary to continue in some respect to be themselves.

The second is the extent to which the rest of the community - those for whom stable community life is important - is willing to require change by those causing the disorder. As noted earlier in the beginning of this document, the Values Group's work goes right to this issue: what is the norm, what might a new normal be, and who is decided today's or tomorrow's norm?

To put it another way, there are two communities within Greater Park Place, and both need to adapt.

One is comprised of those for whom stable community life is important, and whose standards are consistent with the wider market. These residents must overcome their lack of self-organizing capacity, their fear of confrontation, their own disinvestment behaviors (not getting involved, staying inside, keeping quiet, not being confrontational), and become with help more of a force than they are now.

The other are the disorderly themselves who must gain admittance to a new community by changing their behaviors, or be compelled to leave.



In this is the problem of culture versus wealth.35

As the prevailing normal behavior (culture) in Greater Park Place is disorderly and pushes out investment, the result is low value land and housing.

Low value land and housing means low levels of wealth through property ownership.

Any resident of Greater Park Place who bought a home in the last decade is now trapped, having purchased a home that is hard to sell for a price that generates equity. Standing on the sidelines as an owner of a home in Greater Park Place is to stand by while disorderly norms discourage investments.

What is a salient example of culture versus wealth?

Take the corner of 29th and Colonial, an archetype of Greater Park Place - found not everywhere literally but in

a form omnipresent nonetheless. At this intersection there is at 2282 Colonial an apartment building in terrible physical condition, but on par with many multifamily dwellings in Greater Park Place. It projects substantial disorder.

Often in front of that building are three to ten teenagers and young adults. Sometimes there is open air drug dealing there. Lawn chairs are typically scattered about. There is no landscaping to speak of.

The outside market coming through concludes this is the norm. They want nothing to do with such conditions, and pass through quickly.

Across the street is another marginal multifamily property projecting the same negative image. Importantly, catercorner on 29th are 11 residential structures whose owners suffer objective


consequences of the visible signs of disorder at 2282

Colonial.

The normal (as in typical and ordinary for the present time) behavior of the youths and young adults in front of 2282 Colonial - yelling, pushing and shoving, hanging out, buying and selling drugs - is considered disreputable by the wider market. Whether or not the wider market is correct is completely besides the point in terms of market impact. The wider market's reaction to this corner and places like it throughout Norfolk - and indeed America - is negative, drives down values, and results in further decline.

Not all of the behaviors are illegal, though they do correlate to crime.

But overall, they are negative, and are the driving force in the decline of the market.



What's most important is not to debate the judgment of the market, but to acknowledge the impact of that judgment; that the normal behaviors for this corner come at the expense of wealth.


At the same time, the opinions of the wider market only matter if wealth and other benefits of a wealth-generating neighborhood are within reach to those on that corner. What happens when today's norms at 2282 continue is isolation.

The market of families who might take care of their homes, and lead meetings at the civic league, and add to the community's purchasing power for retail goods and services, instead moves elsewhere.

The process by which the community would otherwise maintain control - talking with one another about loud music or a teenager misbehaving - gets undermined. People "shrink" to their own lives and homes, effectively ceding public territory over to a minority of residents who are unwilling to behave in a civilized manner. The reputation for the corner goes from a good place to rent a nice apartment to a place where one can hang out, drink, be loud, deal drugs, be belligerent.³⁶

Two communities emerge.

The one living there or visiting 2282 Colonial acting in ways that disrupt a healthy investment-oriented optimistic community, and for whom these norms are okay.



The other is living in the build's vicinity, watching property values decline, concerned about safety, with an eye on how to get out, and at their personal limits in terms of knowing what to do.

These two communities become the poles of the Greater Park Place, each representing part of a whole who must come together to negotiate a new normal that encourages investment.

The former mainly - but not entirely - low income, African American, renter, with scattered work history, and deep ties to the families of American Americans displaced by both government policies and market activity. The latter is divided again into two groups, one with more moderate and middle incomes and higher levels of education who moved into Greater Park Place the last ten years and who are often property owners, and while mainly African American, not entirely; the other older African American families and retirees who have been in the neighborhood for 25 years or more, own their homes, quietly keep to themselves, and are standard setting good neighbors.

The net reality in the market - while differing from block to block - of Greater Park Place is that one community's behaviors push away healthy investment, while the other is capable of encouraging and attracting it.

For Greater Park Place to co-create a new social agreement amongst itself, these two communities must come together.

The civic leagues do not foster - in their history or their RRO structure - the kind of environment where such agreements can be negotiated. An environment must be created where each of the parties to the negotiation is able to conclude the process is fair and the division of resulting wealth equitable.

Right now, all direct financial wealth (in the form of equity) through property ownership inures to owners. This will not change.

What can be changed is a greater degree of protection against the ups and downs of a market that traditionally displaces low-income renters whenever the going gets good. When the market heats up and supply is constrained, apartments become condos, and renters are at risk of displacement. Apartments that don't get converted still have higher rents, displacing or at the very least imposing financial hardships on low-income families. As ownership occupancy becomes more appealing, community life changes and owner dominance exerts a will over a neighborhood that silences old behaviors - not all of which were necessarily destructive.

What can be changed is a greater degree of protection against the downsides of policy and municipal action that typically shortchanges low-income renters in order to get the good going. When traditional planning occurs, at least one result is the generation of numerous beautiful renderings of what a future neighborhood will look like: Mature tree canopies of 60 year old Elms, nostalgic depictions of life on Kensington Avenue in the 1994 film Meet Me in St. Louis, vibrant retail corridors. Such depictions invariable bear little resemblance either to the status quo, or more importantly to any seeable status quo that might be within reasonable reach of low income renters. For many people, traditional planning is experienced as one stage or another of an organized effort to be legally pushed aside.

In short, while life is getting better for some (typically owners and middle income families and those moving into the neighborhood) it's not getting better for others (typically renters and struggling families already in the neighborhood). Many naturally ask, "why therefore give up some of who I am, if the result is a set of benefits that accrue to someone else?"

There are no easy answers to this difficult and appropriate question.

The wider Norfolk market is mainly comprised of people who have jobs and mortgages and whose life depends on community stability and who effectively set price by what they are and are not attracted to. Greater Park Place has many families who are not employed or employed in low wage jobs and who do not own property. This great disparity is part and parcel of the wealth-assimilation dilemma.

In setting price (demand), these families dictate the terms, that is the conditions they will accept before investing. And in doing so, their buying power can compel a community hungry for wealth to lose something of themselves.

Fortunately there is a substantial upside - <u>an enormous positive benefit</u> - to rising property values: increased quality of life in the form of safety, neighborliness, and prideful appearance.

While the financial gains that result from a revitalized market are distributed mainly to property owners, the quality of life gains are non-discriminatory: *everyone* is safer, *everyone* can enjoy and contribute to good neighborliness, <u>everyone</u> can enjoy and contribute to prideful appearance. And neighborhoods that achieve marketability become neighborhoods that typically are connected to economically integrated schools.

To get to a future moment when the wider market wants to move into the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, no single approach will work. The market will need to be stabilized, a prerequisite for healthy investment. This will require two parallel efforts.

On one side blight will have to be eliminated where conditions are "deteriorating but not unreclaimable". This would be the case with 2282 Colonial, not because the structure has merit, but because neither it nor the corner of 29th and Colonial are so far gone that they

cannot be recovered for a reasonable price, and also because of the importance of that block in setting the tone for the surrounding fabric. On the other, investments in strong property owners - to reinforce the marketable behavioral norms they have and project - must occur.

In practice this means rewarding desired behaviors and pushing back against and eliminating undesired behaviors.

It means money will have to flow towards property owners who maintain their homes and lawns so as to encourage more of the same, as discussed extensively in the subsequent section addressing the importance of strengths.

It means code enforcement and police deployment will have to flow towards 2282 Colonial so that the behaviors centered there are either pushed entirely out of the neighborhood or eliminated altogether.

In practice this means finding combinations where both can occur within 400 feet of one another in the most concentrated manner possible. In practice it also means more troubled blocks and homes purposefully receive less attention.

In sum, desired behaviors (whoever is or can adapt forward to exhibit them) must be encouraged and rewarded. Their encouragement will spur additional positive activity. These are simple, low cost, and basic, but imperative healthy neighborhood building blocks: well kept homes and lawns, peace and quiet, safety.

Undesirable behaviors (exhibited by whoever cannot or refuses to shed them) must be marginalized if not eliminated, either through market activity or public (governmental) policy and intervention. These are simple - sometimes but not always legally enforceable - requirements that might be thought of as the price of admission to the new Greater Park Place neighborhoods: property maintenance neglect, noisy and combative behaviors, crime.

The outcome of this will be a neighborhood managed by a community that prizes stability, and imposes no financial hurdle for membership - as well kept homes and lawns, peace and quiet, safety are low cost items - but one where there is a price of admission in the form of change.

Themes: Building on Strengths

The hard work of investing where it makes most sense is one of the most daunting challenge facing residents stakeholders in Greater Park Place and their partners at the City.

Historically, strong areas are perceived to not need help, and for this reason receive little attention in efforts aimed at revitalization. What happens though is the families who live on the stronger blocks are the very families with the capability to leave and coincidentally those able to most transform their homes and neighborhood.

The time is takes to turn around a failing block is never measured in months, and rarely in years, but rather decades, and often owes not to interventions but displacement strategies or market forces or both. Families on strong blocks eventually grow weary, and become tired of waiting for the changes they feel necessary to justify their continued residency. If conditions do not improve, they will leave, and in their place a family with lesser means will almost always move in.

For this reason, it is essential that Greater Park Place hold onto its stronger blocks and reinvest there first, and grow out from these strengths, rather than focus energy and dollars on weaker areas that will inevitably take time to recover, the primary cost of which is the near certain departure of families on stronger blocks.

The importance of this shift, addressed throughout this document cannot be overstated. But it also requires a complete overhaul of the mindset of the community. In addition it is not merely an issue of which blocks or sections where work should start. At every scale this is the approach we recommend.

Residents who are already raking leaves and planting flowers are those whom we recommend the community organize around. Those who already attend meetings are those who are going to stay with it. House and the people in them taking care of them - whether owner or renter - are the community's most precious assets. Fail to engage these leaders - continually - and they will leave, creating vacuums prone to being filled in this market by investor rather than strong owner occupants.

How will this likely unfold in Norfolk, and in particular in Greater Park Place? Almost all of the financial resources available for community development originate with the federal government in the form of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) that flow to the City of Norfolk on a formula basis in what is known as an entitlement. The balance of most funds will be in the form of federal HOME dollars.

Proposed CDBG projects must be consistent with broad national priorities for CDBG: activities that benefit low- and moderate-income people, the prevention or elimination of slums or blight, or other community development activities to address an urgent threat to health or safety. CDBG funds may be used for community development activities (such as real estate acquisition, relocation, demolition, rehabilitation of housing and commercial buildings), construction of public facilities and improvements (such as water, sewer, and other utilities, street paving, and sidewalks), construction and maintenance of neighborhood centers, and the conversion of school buildings, public services, and economic development and job creation/retention activities. CDBG funds can also be used for preservation and restoration of historic properties in low-income neighborhood. But the tendency is to channel these dollars into activities that serve existing low and moderate income people as ends in and of themselves, rather than to use those dollars to strengthen neighborhoods. Because of this, the orientation of

those dollars tends not to be applied on the strongest blocks, but, rather, on blocks where there is greater need.

Since however all of Greater Park Place qualifies as a low and moderate income area, the discretion for how to spend *within* Greater Park Place becomes a local matter. We are urging the City of Norfolk and NRHA to exercise this discretion and allocate CDBG dollars first on strongest blocks as identified in this study and with the aim of enlarging the areas that contain stronger blocks over time. This is what we mean by building on strengths.

Similarly, HOME funds are also federal block grant dollars. They must be mentioned because they are housing dollars in the form of formula grants to States and localities that communities use - often in partnership with local nonprofit groups - to fund a wide range of activities that build, buy, and/or rehabilitate affordable housing for rent or homeownership or provide direct rental assistance to low-income people.

Why are HOME dollars mentioned here? Greater Park Place is comprised primarily of low and moderate income families. Many homes that need to be repaired are owned by families who cannot afford to make needed upgrades. HOME dollars are an excellent source of funding for this purpose. HOME dollars can be used for a wide variety of housing-related activities.

Participating jurisdictions - of which the City of Norfolk is one - may choose among a broad range of eligible activities, using HOME funds to provide home purchase or rehabilitation financing assistance to eligible homeowners and new homebuyers; build or rehabilitate housing for rent or ownership; or for "other reasonable and necessary expenses related to the development of non-luxury housing," including site acquisition or improvement, demolition of dilapidated housing to make way for HOME-assisted development, and payment of relocation expenses. The City of Norfolk (or an agent of its designation such as NRHA) may use HOME funds to provide tenant-based rental assistance contracts of up to 2 years if such activity is consistent with the City's "consolidated plan" and justified by local market conditions.

Some special conditions apply to the use of HOME funds. The City of Norfolk would have to match every dollar of HOME funds used (except for administrative costs) with 25 cents from nonfederal sources, which may include donated materials or labor, the value of donated property, proceeds from bond financing, and other resources. The match requirement are negotiable under some circumstances.

HOME funds are awarded annually as formula grants to participating jurisdictions. HUD establishes HOME Investment Trust Funds for each grantee, providing a line of credit that the jurisdiction may draw upon. The program's flexibility allows States and local governments to use HOME funds for grants, direct loans, loan guarantees or other forms of credit enhancement, or rental assistance or security deposits.

Like CDBG funds though, HOME funds have tended to be used in response to housing cost and other burdens faced by low and moderate income families, not to trigger market change. For example, HOME and CDBG dollars - the most likely non private monies potentially available for revitalization efforts in Greater Park Place - would likely be used to repair dilapidated housing, but to leverage market change. If there are six homes over two streets that need upgrades, HOME monies will not default to repair the homes on the stronger street, as is usually the best path to take to strengthen a declining market. That decision is entirely local, but without a commitment to build on strengths, available dollars will usually be deployed ineffectively.

Themes: Changing Direction

The hard work of shifting from need-based to market-oriented

For more than 40 years, Greater Park Place has been in one form of receivership or another. It has been a veritable ward of the state. Federal and state housing and community development dollars, technical assistance, consultant advice, and one form or another of planning have all gone into Greater Park Place at considerable cost. Yet the four neighborhoods have largely remained unimproved except for a few disconnected parts.

There are two key learnings from this. First, some of what has been done has worked and the philosophy behind and approach in those cases should be continued and widened. Second, some of what has been done has not worked and should be discontinued or at least rethought.

The essence of works in such situations as Greater Park Place is in respositioning the housing stock and the community context - the environment of parks and trees and behaviors and curb cuts and sidewalks - to become a place people *want* to move to, *want* to buy a home in, and *want* stay and upgrade if already there.

This requires more of what works and less of what does not. What works more than anything else is predictable standards of property maintenance done routinely and voluntarily without anyone needing to be told to do it. Code enforcement is a necessary tool to address the occasional reprobate unwilling to be a property steward and good neighbor, but this must be the exception.

An important shift to get there is one of emphasis. It means that people who live in Greater Park Place must begin to think of themselves not as low-income people who need housing assistance but as a community capable of partnering and generating results in the form of streets that shine, homes that are polished, and residents who are neighborly.

These qualities exist in abundance in Greater Park Place, but they are often scattered. With the exception of some key blocks in Park Place and in Lamberts Point, Greater Park Place lacks blocks where these important characteristics exist in a critical mass. This is a large part of why the recommended strategy is to invest heavily in code enforcement and policing on and near those blocks where conditions are already close to being marketable, ensuring they indeed tip forward.

Resident stakeholders in this process have from the beginning expressed justifiable angst in response to a strategy that is market-oriented. A market-orientation appears to many to have improved neighboring Ghent but also to have pushed out many. A market-oriented strategy appears to many to have upgraded downtown but to have created a place for only a few. So it is entirely understandable that discussion of markets and preferences and choices will leave many focusing on the potential for unfavorable consequences. And for a community long accustomed to being on the receiving end of programs and policies - regardless of intent and outcome - the idea of being on the driving end of things is indeed a shift and something new.

Our "read" of the market is that Norfolk is going to be soft for quite some time. The existence of six dozen vacant parcels in Greater Park Place means there is plenty of room to absorb development without creating any displacement pressures. These two facts - market softness regionally and vacant land inside Greater Park Place - mean the neighborhood can be repositioned in a market orientation, and resources can be aimed at demand instead of need, and the community can grow together.

Themes: Partnership

The hard work of changing the way the communities relate to one another

A significant observation czb made during this project is the lack of partnership in a number of vital places. We were struck by the following:

- 1. For a market that has been in decline for 40 years, the absence of a viable non-for-profit community development entity focused on Greater Park Place is striking.³⁸ It speaks to several issues.
 - Where is the Norfolk philanthropic community in terms of community development in near downtown neighborhoods?
 - What role have corporations had historically in community development?
 - The absence of a viable entity also reinforces our sense of how undeveloped resident capacity is.
- 2. NRHA as the primary vehicle in Norfolk for delivering housing and community development services and financial resources means that the work of housing and community development will by definition be shaped by a real estate development point of view.
 - This can pose problems when neighborhoods like those of Greater Park Place are concerned where the main challenges are not physical but social and economic.
 - It has substantial implications for partnership, as partners will tend to be lenders and developers, as opposed to organizers and strategists. All are needed.
- 3. The Civic Leagues do not function well in our view. Roberts Rules of Order predominates. Presentations occur but "conversation" appears limited. Attendance varies widely.
- 4. The Police Department has no discernible presence in the community other than to respond to crimes and complaints. In eight months we never once encountered the police walking the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, talking with residents, engaging the community in partnership.
- 5. Code Enforcement was similarly MIA. Caseload data make it clear they are in Greater Park Place. But we never encountered them working with residents, helping residents comply with codes.
- 6. Residents we spoke with rarely speak well of City Hall with the exception of their admiration for their city councilors. There is a tremendous amount of distrust in local government to be a partner.

These observations are just that. But if there is truth to them, then the corrosive impacts of uninspired relationships instead of strong and genuine partnership will have to get addressed. When combined with an important "norm" of residents "expecting" the City to take care of problems that other neighborhoods take care of on their own, it illustrates the importance of going forward with intentional cross discipline teams in the areas of public safety and code compliance so that new relationships can be formed. It also illustrates the notable absence of an institutional presence in Greater Park Place on the part of local hospitals, the US Navy and Marine Corps, banks, realtors, and others. The vacuum is striking.

Our sense is that the severity of the challenges in Greater Park Place are almost entirely *non real estate development* oriented, even though recovery will require some form of such activity, and sooner rather than too far later. Partnership - not contractual relations - but partnership, will be a key component of any potential success. Partnership across sectors, between City Council and residents, between City Hall and residents, across Civic Leagues, and with the Police Department.

F - Implementation Structure

Implementing the work of building the community's capacity requires structure.

One approach is a loose-fitting structure mainly centered on the work of volunteers with support from the City of Norfolk's Department of Planning (Code Enforcement), Office of Recreation, Parks, and Open Space, and the Police Department. This approach would rely on volunteers to mobilize the community and obtain assistance enforcing property conditions standards, installing and maintaining landscaping, and enforcing public safety. This approach would also rely on NRHA disposing of vacant land and developing real estate in ways consistent with market conditions and an aim of economic diversity. This approach is not recommended. Our view is that this approach leaves residents in a position of having to consistently ask for help that the city may be unable to provide.

We do not advocate throwing out the baby with the bath water, however. The contributions towards market stability that can be made by the City are substantial. Provided the community is growing it's capacity all along, the introduction of landscaping and tree canopy installation is going to be vital. Provided the community is becoming more cohesive, the use of code enforcement as a tool less aimed at fixing problems than encouraging compliance will be critical. Provided the community is feeling safer but as if it is living in a police state and that the police are genuine partners, the work to be done by the police department is going to be invaluable. And provided the community is becoming more economically diverse, the introduction of new housing products developed by NRHA will be substantial.

The "trick" is to harness these important contributions in ways that:

- 1) Leave the community ever more empowered and ever less dependent
- 2) Even if gradually over many years result in an economically diverse market with less concentrated poverty
- 3) Establish firm and rising standards of property ownership and public behaviors
- 4) Reposition the neighborhoods as communities of choice in the wider Norfolk market

For this reason, our recommended structure hybridizes the volunteer approach is more rigid organizational context. We believe that the existing Old Dominion University Community Development Corporation could become the delivery vehicle for implementing the recommendations in this report. Our experience is the shifts we recommend - for residents, city agencies, and potential corporate and philanthropic partners - will not just happen. They will require the intention that they happen and ownership of those intentions is located in an organization that is distinctly separate from existing Norfolk Civic League and municipal systems.

Modifying the organization structure of the the ODU-CDC, and shifting CDBG and HOME entitlement funding towards the CDC as a designed sub-recipient is our recommended course.

DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY
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1. First three years presume \$150,000/yr from ODU and \$315,000 in expenses, the gap to be raise mainly from 5-6 committed small donors. 2. Year #2 (2012) presumes initiation of a CDBG sub-recipient designation from the City of Norfolk. [see notes below]

RE: CDBG sub recipient designation:

This operating estimate would have to be reconsidered entirely if such a designation and resulting flow of resources were unavailable.

G - Consultant Comment

A project of this nature - complicated, intense, and frequently operating at the margins of people's and well as institutional tolerance - ultimately is successful not for the words contained in a final report, but for the intentions of stakeholders to make recommendations come to life.

Just getting to a point where a handoff can occur from a two dimensional report to a live effort is the result of hard work, dedication to craft, and persistence. More that that, it is the work of partnership.

czb would like to thank the Department of Planning for their patience on one hand, and insistence on *getting it right* on the other. Every piece of data we needed, counsel we sought, and insight we required was made available to us throughout. The expertise of the Department of Planning was exceptional, and will be a key element in any future success.

Of course the flow of emails, telephone calls, conference calls, meetings, dinner conversations, and Saturday work efforts in the blazing July Norfolk sun didn't just happen, either. They occurred because a handful of gifted, energetic and at times uncompromising resident stakeholders showed up, spoke up, stood up, and insisted on things being shaken up. We would like to thank the many residents who did such incredible work for themselves and their neighbors and their city, and in particular give a shout out to those who really worked 24-7 all year long - you know who you are!

Finally, it is never easy work to turn around neighborhoods. Greater Park Place faces years of hard work. But our team learned as much or more from the candor and generosity of the above resident leaders than from any group of concerned citizens anywhere. We applaed you.

H - Notes on Participation

To envision and engage.

What does that mean? As noted on p 14 of this document, participation in this process largely meant participation by working and moderate home owners, and the elderly. Despite continual outreach efforts, participation by low-income residents, especially renters, proved elusive.

Bridging the class divide in the four neighborhoods will be essential for any long term stability to take hold. The bottom line is that in the four VEP neighborhoods of Greater Park Place, there are too many struggling families with low income, low job projects, and who are accustomed to behavior norms that simply are inconsistent with the standards of the wider community. Until these families are part of the progress of Greater Park Place in a genuine and meaningful way, there will remain high levels of social instability.

Our experience is that the best way to bridge this gap is through a combination of recognizing that virtually everyone - regardless of income and race and gender - fundamentally wants a safe community to live in, and that virtually everyone wants to live in a home and on a block that exhibits pride. While there are varying comfort levels with neighborhood conditions and thus differing thresholds among people for what constitutes "safe", and while there are varying definitions of what constitutes pride of residency, these are issues that people actually can come together around. Our experience is that organized community beautification projects that have planning and site selection, installation, and maintenance phases to them are the most effective way to start bridging these divides.

There are other ways to do this, though care must be given to how each of these and other approaches would bridge or widen the class divide in Greater Park Place.

On-line social networks are actively used throughout Greater Park Place - and families of all incomes participate. In this effort 117 residents participated in an on-going basis on a Facebook page set up for this project. After months of observing participation levels though, we concluded that the class divide was not bridged through on-line activity; rather it merely became an extension of it. So while we would recommend its continuation, we would not suggest it alone should be relied on as a tool for bringing the community of different classes closer together.

The YMCA - should it be constructed - offers a golden opportunity for Greater Park Place to continue meaningful engagement. Shared space - as the residents know well from use of the community centers - has great meaning. The "Y" can massively leverage it's potential presence in profound ways. We encourage it to not just drop in a building and a program. Rather we encourage the use of a charrette to help with physical design considerations as well as programming. For very little cost, these would be two ways to perform outreach that will serve to anchor the new facility into the emotional texture of the community more deeply than might otherwise be the case.

Finally, and in sum, the point is that no opportunity should be missed to reach out to disenfranchised people. Resident oversight and partnership of the stabilization zone, participation in the Y, on-line outreach. They all should be aimed at knitting this community back together.


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- ¹ Hoboken was not revitalized in the late 1970s and early 1980s because it suddenly became fashionable to adapt old factories along the Hudson; it enjoyed a renaissance because of skyrocketing real estate prices in the West Village. The physical setting in and around H Street, NE in Washington, DC is the same today as it was in 1910, in 1935, 1960, and 1985. In 1910 it flourished. Today it is being "rediscovered". From 1965 to 1995, H Street has been in state or another of distress. The reason? The degree of confidence the market felt about the wisdom of investing there, confidence derived not from the buildings per se, but the conditions of the buildings and the signal that such conditions projected.
- ² As Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (American Apartheid, p. 83) note: "The spatial isolation of black Americans was achieved by a conjunction of racist attitudes, private behaviors, and institutional practices that disenfranchised blacks from urban housing markets and led to the creation of the ghetto." Reversing spatial isolation in Norfolk where the white-black dissimilarity index is 57.5 will require much more than just some stakeholders making changes. The whole Norfolk community will have to decide how economically segregated it wants to be.
- ³ In the community review of the October 2010 draft version of this document, one citizen wrote of being "deeply offended" by this statement, writing that it "suggests negative owner and resident behaviors are self-induced whereas the City and NRHA "interventions" designed to save us from ourselves are simply ineffective or benign in nature." The reviewer went on to comment that "the truth is we need to discontinue 'self destructive owner and resident behaviors' AND destructive and [sic] behaviors and interventions on behalf of our governmental partners." Additional comments on this front noted that "we don't have concentrated poverty because of 'ineffective interventions', we have it by designed practice and policy." Finally, it was noted that "the concentration of needs-based programs and services in 'these' neighborhoods" further serves to concentrate poverty.
- ⁴ Why "score" properties and property conditions? Scoring property conditions according to a rating scale creates a baseline, the importance of which is to be able to measure change over time. It also enables geocoding and mapping and a deeper understanding of the qualitative nature of how a neighborhood looks and feels. These scores can then be evaluated in the context of property values, tenure, and other data to determine what correlations exist in a given market. Importantly, they also enable comparisons to be made, allowing any number of "what if" scenarios to be considered through regression analysis. This can often pinpoint important influences in a neighborhood. The more important question for this project was not how those scores would be used, but rather that the scoring was done by residents of the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place. This has the impact of helping residents learn to work together and learn first hand what kinds of outcomes (conditions) result from what kinds of residency patterns. In this project the collection of property conditions data was more about community organizing and standard setting than in data collection and analysis.
- ⁵ "Thus in addition to its effects on the morale of residents, disorder sends signals about neighborhood problems to potential residents and investors. Is this a good area to move into? Will my mortgage be safe there?" (see Disorder and Decline by Wesley Skogan, p. 50).
- ⁶ Housing market values are considerably lower than the Norfolk city average; Lamberts Point values are 57% of the Virginia average, Park Place and Kensington are 28% of the Virginia average, and Villa Heights is 47% of the Virginia average. (see www.city-data.com)
- ⁷ There has been a sustained presence in this planning effort by eight residents, six from Park Place, one from Kensington, and two from Lamberts Point. There has been electronic/digital participation on a sustained basis by 130 people. 115 residents are active on a facebook page established for this project. More than 100 residents attended two public meetings. 15 small group meetings were held during the Spring and Summer 2010 illustrating the presence of a small but determined and hard-working core of residents. Residents not consultants evaluated 3,200 structures. And residents not consultants have been holding on-going neighborhood conversations about difficult issues such as a racial politics, residential settlement, gentrification, distress, and revitalization.
- ⁸ Gains in values result in greater ad valorem. An increase of merely 1.5% for all residential value in Greater Park Place would increase revenue from \$509,158 to \$\$763,737.

- ⁹ Average assessed single family homes for Lambert's Point between \$\$126,000-\$220,000; for Kensington: \$126,000-\$140,000; for Park Place \$158,000-\$220,000; for Villa Heights \$116,000-\$128,000 according to czbLLC Submarket Analysis. Only 32% of all occupied units are owner-occupied; there are 86 parcels of commercially vacant land, 41 parcels industrially vacant land, 163 parcels of City owned vacant land, 168 parcels of NRHA vacant land, 518 parcels of residential vacant land, 21 parcels of state-owned vacant land. Additionally, Lambert's Point reported 47.2% population below poverty level, Kensington/Park Place reported 30.6% population below poverty level, Villa Heights reported 21.4% population below poverty level with Norfolk average of 19.4% according to http://www.city-data.com/city/Norfolk-Virginia.html neighborhood pages. When asked to evaluate physical state of residential properties on a scale of 1-4 (1 being good, 4 being poor), throughout the neighborhoods, areas in Lambert's Point scored an average of 1.14-2.72, Kensington scored 2.40-2.75, Park Place scored 1.79-2.74, and Villa Heights scored 2.54-2.67 as extracted from czbLLC Submarket Analysis. Finally, personal theft over the past five years is highly concentrated in the Park Place and Kensington neighborhoods while Property theft frequently occurs over all four neighborhoods.
- ¹⁰ See work of the St. Paul Foundation as well as Pew Charitable Trusts as described in Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies (http://ips.jhu.edu/pub/Revitalizing-Baltimore-An-Assessment-of-Five-Touted-Urban-Revitalization-Strategies).
- 11 The issue of what is "valued" by which market segment is a crucial element of understanding the challenge of successfully repositioning and promoting Greater Park Place (GPP) as a community of choice. Housing demand in America since 1946 has primarily been driven by the market's appetite to live in new homes. All else being equal, regression analyses of housing value in almost every market in the United States shows a new home is more desirable than an older alternative. In a group of neighborhoods like those comprising GPP where 90 percent of the residential structures were built before 1950, this is very relevant. How vacant lots are redeveloped becomes especially important. A second very important element in marketing GPP is that increasing prosperity of African American households has translated into the same preferences for new housing traditionally expressed by non-African American households. When it is said that the historic homes in GPP are a great asset, it is important to be aware of that fact that for many African American families, older homes may not necessarily be their home of first choice, just as it is rarely the home of first choice for the rest of America. The bottom line as it relates to the challenge of repositioning GPP is that talk of the "wonderful historic homes" as if their are viewed only as assets is a serious misreading of the market. Those wonderful historic homes are expensive to maintain and costly to recover; they are assuredly prized by some market segments, but for all the marketing value they have, they also are a tremendous challenge.
- A compliance and reward orientation acknowledges 25 percent of the code violations tend to be very minor and are curable with small amounts of time and money, but what is mostly needed is encouragement, planning, and neighborly help; 25 percent result from elderly residents who can't make repairs but who can still take care of matters once addressed; and 25 percent are absentee owners who aren't aware of violations and genuinely want to be good neighbors. Of course on the most distressed blocks these numbers skew in more odious direction, and on stabler blocks the numbers are more encouraging. The point is that are deeper analysis, it takes less effort to move a somewhat stable block than a weaker block, and realizing three in four violations on average are really matters that can be handled through partnership and small disbursements, creates maneuvering room to focus on the 25 percent who are genuine problems.
- ¹³ When standards are not reliably on par with widely accepted (and desired) community norms, demand falls. When demand falls, prices fall, leading to diminished (and self-fulfilling) expectations for comparable rates of return. In Greater Park Place this way this is manifest is roughly two thirds of the community (mainly comprised of owner occupants and the elderly) have a set of standards more or less equivalent to those in the broader market, and the other third (mainly comprised of renters and absentee owners) has a different one that is not appealing to the market and that serves to weaken Greater Park Place.
- ¹⁴ In the same way that we encourage that code enforcement shift from being complaint and enforcement driven to compliance oriented, we encourage the Police Department to shift from being complaint and crime responsive to partnership oriented, from auto-dependent patrols to foot and bicycle patrols, from focusing on property crimes to focusing on loitering, speeding, verbal harassment, noise, and other nuisance issues, from being randomly present everywhere to predictably present in targeted areas, and from being inconsistently the same office known by residents to having a near permanent assignment in a specific targeted area.

- ¹⁵ All data in this report are discussed in comparative terms. So in this case, this statement reflects that compared to the median value of homes in Norfolk and the median rate of appreciation, values and appreciation in Greater Park Place are falling.
- ¹⁶ Primarily in the form of increased rental tenure, increased rental vacancy, and decreased home values.
- ¹⁷ Poverty rates measured citywide range from 16.3 to 19.4 percent depending on the date and source. The appropriate citywide goal is a fair share distribution. Greater Park Place's percentages (30.6%) are 50-60 percent higher than the city average. Getting the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place to a share at the 15 percent level would be an appropriate goal as long as the city levels remains in the 15-20 percent range.

18





For the City of Norfolk, poverty in general and geographic concentrations of poverty are substantial challenges going forward. Whenever possible, mixed-income housing development is encouraged.

- ¹⁹ The urban redevelopment of Ghent has left an indelible stain in Norfolk. In the minds of many lower income and other families - especially African American families we met in this project, gains now evidenced in the form of market stability, retail corridor vibrancy, and quality of life came both at the expense of and through the displacement of lower income black families. James Baldwin's description of this process as "Negro Removal" (from a 1963 conversation with Kenneth Clark), captures some of the subrosa sentiment we heard in our engagement with Greater Park Place community. Urban renewal of course has a mixed record, but the collective community memory of the "renewal" of Boston's historic West End through "deslumming" in the 1950s is noteworthy. Decades after "renewal" community flyers, pamphlets, and newspapers continued to be produced serving as a reminder to the sentiments of many that there actions of the Boston Redevelopment Agency were unjustified. In Norfolk, residents we met expressed sentiment that improvements to Greater Park Place would invariably come only through the displacement of low-income residents. When in the course of our engagement conversations, residents were informed of one set of facts about market softness and braking mechanisms such as vacant lot proliferation, our team was informed of another set of facts, which is that their fear of displacement remains. Two important conclusions are worthy of comment. First, the level of distrust of the City of Norfolk is high, and the burden is on the City to rebuild it. Second, residents fearing displacement as a consequence of improvement will choose no improvement if it means no displacement, until such time as trust is rebuilt.
- ²⁰ 79 percent of respondents to a czb resident survey indicated they believe "outsiders" view Greater Park Place negatively.
- ²¹ See p. 95-99 of <u>The Content of Our Character</u> by Shelby Steele for a discussion on the double bind of race and class, assimilation and wealth.

- ²² In particular, there are three predominant groups of residents in Greater Park Place: older families and the elderly, younger upwardly mobile (and usually college educated) home owners, many who moved into the community in the last ten years, and lower-income families with limited upward mobility. Agreement exists across these groups that there are challenges like safety. But there is frequent disagreement about what constitutes an acceptable standard of behavior or for property maintenance. Furthermore, when we unpacked the essence of this disagreement, we discovered a great deal of concern that the "standards" acceptable to the market lacked legitimacy, coming either from newcomers or outsiders. Amplifying the standards concerns are as noted displacement concerns. Liberty Park, Broad Creek, Ghent, West Ghent, and Robin Hood Apartments are important mentioned examples where displacement has occurred, and is recalled.
- ²³ ibid endnote no. 5
- ²⁴ The casualties will be some lost identity and for those unwilling to adapt, lost position in the community; if the community overall refuses to accept these "losses", it will likely *trade* retention of identity for lesser real estate value in a market that does not prize the social norms that prevail in Greater Park Place
- ²⁵ Implementation of an appropriate code enforcement regimen alongside a suitable community policing program will not alone be sufficient to stabilize the neighborhoods of Greater Park Place. These are more "reset" than revitalization tools than. Used properly (code compliance and code enforcement, alongside genuine community policing), these tools help reestablish a sense of order after which investment can occur in a 'peace-of-mind' context now missing. What other tools are recommended? Independent of both code enforcement and community policing, residents need encouragement and incentives to work together at the block level to assert their own more granular standards on one hand, and do so while truly getting to know one another on the other. The beautification efforts sporadically deployed in 2010 as part of this project need to be continued as the principal vehicle through which average citizens can become engaged and take control of their streets, asserting their values and standards through planning, installation, and on-going care.
- ²⁶ An important question was raised by citizens during the review of this document: what happens on the engagement front in areas where there isn't a focused? Concentrations of police and code enforcement resources in semi-stable areas does not preclude continued deployment of outreach and beautification-based organizing in weaker areas. The market effect that Greater Park Place should strive for is one where strong families who want to move into strong areas cannot afford to do so, and then invest three blocks away and bring their strengths there.
- ²⁷ Metrics to include z-scored property value changes relative to the City of Norfolk, relationships with residents, volume of arrests for disorderly conduct infractions, reductions in complaints and calls, and community evaluation of performance
- ²⁸ Kentfield neighborhood (Townhome/Bianchi)
- ²⁹ Stabilization will be very difficult to achieve without a robust rental property registration requirement. Our view is that in Greater Park Place, the more troubled properties are absentee owned. The City's code enforcement office has its hands tied in dealing with problem rental property owners. Without a mandatory rental property registration and inspection requirement, stabilization will be very difficult.
- ³⁰ Here defined not a market conditions for that block but rather in line with the city or area median
- ³¹ Specific ratios can be explored further but we recommend that all structures < 4 units be developed at a 25-80 ratio, that is 25% for HHs at 80% AMI and 75% at 100% AMI or above; 4-8 units be developed at 12-80, 9-30 units @ 20-80, and 30-100 units at 25-80.
- ³² Skogan, Wesley <u>Disorder and Decline</u>; University of California Press. Berkeley. 1990. p. 2
- 33 Ibid
- 34 Ibid
- ³⁵ Volume 45, No 1, February 2008: Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction of Concentrated Racial Inequality, by Robert J. Sampson and Patrick Sharkey n "Demography"

³⁶ Making Neighborhoods Safe in Atlantic Monthly, 3/1989; George Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 25-39
³⁷ Ibid
³⁸ The Old Dominion University CDC is a legally viable entity. It has a working board and an Executive Director. It has an enormous role to play in leading in the redevelopment of Greater Park Place. But it is a fraction of the size we would expect to see in a city of Norfolk's size and sophistication, and we point this out because the absence of an organization such as Anchorage Neighborhood Housing (Alaska) or Chinese Community Housing (San Francisco) is noteworthy, as is no LISC or Enterprise Foundation or Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation presence. It speaks to the community's limited overall capacity to work together constructively.